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Traditional work in operations management has focused on topics such as sup-
ply chain contracts and pricing, studying design of efficient contracts and optimal
pricing policies. After these optimal solutions and recommendations are derived,
they must be implemented properly by managers in practice. Because this process
is subject to behavioral decision biases, work in behavioral operations management
has begun to connect theories of decision biases to behavior in classical operations
management. My dissertation focuses in this area by studying how decisions are
made by suppliers and retailers in B2B settings.
In essay one, I investigate the effect of effort-dependent demand on supply
chain contracts. It is found that the actual cost of effort affects the retailers optimal
level of effort and subsequently determines when a supplier should prefer a wholesale
price contract to a buyback contract. As the retailers cost of effort increases, the
retailers optimal level of effort decreases, leading the supplier to prefer the wholesale
price contract. It is verified experimentally that retailer and supplier decisions are
driven by cost of retailer effort. Furthermore, I demonstrate that suppliers’ contract
preferences are influenced by effort cost, not expected profit.
In essay two, I look at the link between two supply chain decisions that have
previously not been connected before. In this this essay, I study how the contract
type (wholesale price or buyback) offered to the retailer affects his decision about
which product to stock, particularly when one product is obviously riskier than an-
other. I find, experimentally, that while contract type should make no difference
in preferences between a safe and risky product, the retailer displays markedly dif-
ferent preferences arcoss contract type. I propose that this difference in preference
structure can be explained by a model that incorporates a Prospect Theory weight-
ing function. Finally, I demonstrate experimentally that this behavioral model of
choice explains retailer product choice both when making the isolated product choice
decision and the joint product/quantity decision.
The Effect of Behavioral Biases on Supply Chain Decisions
by
Anna Gloria Devlin
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment










I owe my gratitude to all the people who have made this dissertation possible
and because of whom my this will be a part of my life that I will always cherish.
First and foremost I’d like to thank my advisor, Professor Wedad Elmaghraby,
for giving me an invaluable opportunity to work on challenging and extremely in-
teresting projects over the past five years. She has always made herself available
for help and advice. I have learned countless lessons from her that will be useful
throughout my career.
I would also like to thank my committee member and co-author, Professor Re-
becca Hamilton. Without her extraordinary knowledge of marketing and willingness
to dedicate her time mentoring me through a new area of research my dissertation
would have only been an idea. Thanks are due also to Professor Yi Xu, Professor
Stephanie Eckerd and Professor Erkut Ozbay for agreeing to serve on my dissertation
committee and for sparing their invaluable time reviewing the manuscript.
I would like to thank all of the doctoral students I have worked with and
Justina Blanco who have both formally and informally shaped my dissertation by
providing assistance in new areas or talking through road blocks in my research.
In particular, I would like to thank Professor David Anderson and Professor Brad
Greenwood for their moral and academic support during my time as a doctoral
student.
I owe my deepest thanks to my family - my mom and dad who have always
had faith in me, providing every bit of support and encouragement I have needed;
ii
my sister, Nora, for always believing that I’d achieve my life long goal; and finally
my siste,r Bridget, and fiance, Brian, who have spent countless hours listening to
my ramblings/presentation rehearsals, providing thoughtful feedback, and being test
subjects for my experiments.




List of Figures vii
1 Understanding the Appeal of Suboptimal Contracts 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Supply Chain Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Principal Agent Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Model and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Assumptions for Laboratory Implementation . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.2 The Retailer Selection of Effort and Quantity . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.3 The Supplier’s Contract Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.4 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Study 1: Retailer Effort Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.1 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.1.1 Cost/Demand Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.1.2 Contract Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.1.3 Retailer Effort Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4.1.4 Dependent Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 Study 2: Supplier Contract Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5.1 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5.1.1 Cost/Demand Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5.1.2 Retailer Effort Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5.1.3 Contract Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.1.4 Dependent Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5.2.1 Supplier Predictions of Retailer Effort . . . . . . . . 36
1.5.2.2 Supplier Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.6 Study 3: The Effect of Retailer Business Practices on Supplier Con-
tract Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
iv
1.6.1 Pretest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.6.2 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6.2.1 Retailer Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.6.2.2 Cost and Demand Information . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.6.2.3 Contract Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.6.2.4 Dependent Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.6.2.5 Scales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.6.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.6.3.1 Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.6.3.2 Open-Ended Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.6.3.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2 The Effect of Contract Type on Risky Product Related Decisions 58
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2.1 Retail Product Assortment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2.2 Behavioral Decision Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3 Model and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.3.1 Pilot Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.3.2 Potential Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.3.3 Prospect Theory Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.3.4 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.4 Study 1: Retailer Product Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.4.1 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4.1.1 Product Category Information . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.4.1.2 Contract Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.4.1.3 Demand Distribution of Product Options . . . . . . 87
2.4.1.4 Comparable Metrics for Product Options . . . . . . . 88
2.4.1.5 Dependent Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.5 Study 2: The Joint Product/Quantity Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.5.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.5.2 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A Retailer/Supplier Interview 114
B Chapter 1 Study Procedures 120
B.0.1 Contract Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B.0.2 Study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B.0.3 Study 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
v
B.0.4 Study 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
C Chapter 2 Study Procedures 134
C.1 Pilot Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
C.2 Study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
C.3 Study 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
D Individual Differences Scales 142
D.1 Loss Aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
D.2 Risk Aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
D.3 Anticipated Regret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143




1.1 Optimal Retailer effort (ρ̂ and ρ̂b)
For C1=100, ξ uniformly distributed on [110, 510], κ = 60, w = 40,
(wb, b) = (40.5, 38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1 Screen Shot from Table Condition of Pilot Study . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.2 Screen Shot from Graph Condition of Pilot Study . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.3 Illustration of Prospect Theory Value Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4 Illustration of Demand Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.5 Comparable Metrics provided in Wholesale Price Condition for Small
p(L) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.6 Comparable Metrics provided in Buyback Condition for Small p(L) . 90
2.7 Screen Shot of Tables Provided in Study 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.8 Average Quantity Decisions as a Fraction of Optimal . . . . . . . . . 105
vii
Chapter 1: Understanding the Appeal of Suboptimal Contracts
1.1 Introduction
The typical supply chain is plagued with the problem of coordinating disparate
incentives between retailers and suppliers. Research in supply chain management
has generated recommendations for coordinating contracts promising improved per-
formance and profits (see Cachon 2003 for a review). Contracts such as the buyback
contract theoretically achieve supply chain coordination by allowing the supplier to
share the retailer’s risk. When using a buyback contract, the supplier offers to buy
back leftover inventory from a retailer at some price less than the initial price. This
reduces the retailer’s risk, encouraging a larger order quantity and creating higher
expected profits for both parties. Despite the academically appealing properties
of these shared risk contracts, they have failed to gain significant traction in the
field. Instead, the literature suggests that most professionals cling to the simple, yet
supposedly economically flawed, wholesale price contract (Cachon 2003, Keser and
Paleologo 2004). In this paper, we examine one of the reasons why suppliers may
prefer the wholesale price contract.
One industry that could especially benefit from the use of buyback contracts
is fashion retail. Fashion goods are perishable and there is a significant degree of
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uncertainty about consumer demand. Yet, even in this industry, wholesale price
contracts are the most prevalent contracts used (Cachon 2003, Keser and Paleologo
2004). In our own interviews conducted with 14 fashion retailers and suppliers, only
three firms we interviewed reported using any type of buyback contract, and their
use seemed to be accompanied by increased scrutiny of retailer business practices.
For example, a purchasing manager from a large athletic clothing company reported
traveling to retailer stores with low sales to check placement of the product and
salesperson behavior.
Notably, the business press suggests that although suppliers are hesitant to
enter into buyback contracts, retailers seem to welcome them. Writing in the Wall
Street Journal, Byron (2005) suggests that suppliers view buyback contracts as un-
fair because they are held liable for the retailer’s inability to sell inventory. In
contrast, wholesale price contracts eliminate this concern by making the retailer
the sole residual claimant of the inventory. Consistently, when we coded online
content (N = 146 between 2005 and 2012) from a Google search of “buyback con-
tracts”/“markdown money”/“markdown allowance” for perspective (supplier vs. re-
tailer) and tone (negative vs. positive), we found that 35% of the content discussed
negative supplier perceptions while 20% of the content discussed positive retailer
perceptions of these contracts. This evidence suggests that negative perceptions of
suppliers, rather than retailers, may be limiting the use of buyback contracts (and
theoretically equivalent markdown money contracts; see Tsay 2002) in practice.
Why do we see this discrepancy between supplier and retailer perceptions
of buyback contracts? Retailers can increase demand by exerting costly effort.
2
For example, retailers can invest in targeted advertising (Lewis and Reiley 2011),
training salespeople (Martin and Collins 1991) or carefully designing store layout
(Design Council of the UK 2008) to increase demand. Although higher retailer
effort may increase revenues for both the retailer and supplier, effort is costly only
to the retailer and is not perfectly verifiable by the supplier. A few papers have
theoretically studied the implications of costly retailer effort on shared risk contracts
[Taylor (2002), Krishnan et al. (2004), Cachon and Lariviere (2005)]. Krishnan et
al. (2004) study how retailer effort is influenced by the presence of a buyback,
and they find that although the presence of a buyback increases the retailer’s order
quantity, it may disincentivize the retailer’s effort.
In line with these results, work within operations studying optimal salesforce
compensation in a multi-task setting finds that some incentives are inefficient in
the sense that they incentivize effort for one task while disincentivizing it for an-
other when inventory considerations are present [Chen (2000), Plambeck and Zenios
(2003), Chen (2005), Jerath et al. (2010), Saghafian and Chao (2011), Dai and
Jerath (2013)]. We propose that a buyback contract creates a similar trade-off in
retailer’s actions: while a buyback aims to incentivize higher order quantities, it may
decrease the retailers unobservable effort to increase demand, potentially creating a
situation in which the supplier is worse off with the buyback contract. Moreover,
retailers may be heterogeneous in that some retailers may incur low costs when they
engage in demand-stimulating activities and others may incur high costs. Thus, a
buyback contract might work well to properly incentivize retailers with low costs
of effort, but might backfire and make a supplier worse off when facing a retailer
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with high costs of effort. Previous theoretical work has not considered the effects of
effort-dependent demand on contract performance in the context of heterogeneous
retailers.
These streams of literature and anecdotal evidence from practice motivate our
analytical model that describes how both cost of retailer effort and contract type
impact retailer decisions and ultimately expected profit. This model provides the
basis for a set of hypotheses that can be empirically tested in a laboratory setting.
After a brief review of relevant literature in Section 1.2, we present our model in
Section 1.3 that characterizes the retailer’s equilibrium effort and supplier’s profits
as a function of retailer’s cost of effort and contract. Our analytical model predicts
that retailer effort will decrease as cost of effort increases and in the presence of
a buyback. This creates changes in supplier expected profits that may shift their
relative preferences for the wholesale price and buyback contract. We translate these
results into predictions about rational, risk-neutral retailer decisions and supplier
preferences between buyback and wholesale price contracts.
In Section 1.4, we test our hypotheses regarding retailer effort in a lab setting
where retailers interact with a computerized supplier. The results of the experiment
show that participants acting as retailers (1) exert lower effort under higher costs of
effort and (2) exert less effort when offered the buyback contract than the wholesale
price contract, supporting both our theoretical model and observed supplier aver-
sion to buyback contracts. In Section 1.5, we test our predictions regarding supplier
preferences experimentally by manipulating retailer cost of effort and the relative
profitability of the two contracts. Results suggest that participants acting as suppli-
4
ers do not behave in a profit maximizing manner. However, their preferences can be
linked to their suboptimal predictions of retailer effort under the buyback contract.
In Section 1.6, we explore supplier preferences in a more realistic setting where no
information about effort cost is available or only retailer business practices can be
observed. We find a pattern of results consistent with our previous study in which
suppliers were provided with explicit cost information. Notably, we demonstrate
that in the absence of cost information, participants behave as if the retailer has a
high cost of effort and exhibit a strong preference for the wholesale price contract.
This suggests that suppliers are pessimistic, assuming a high cost of effort when no
information is available. We conclude in Section 1.7 with a discussion of our results
and their managerial implications.
1.2 Literature Review
This research draws on two main bodies of literature: (1) Supply chain con-
tracts and (2) Principal agent theory. Below, we briefly review the relevant aspects
of these literature streams in relation to our current research question.
1.2.1 Supply Chain Contracts
Within a supply chain context, a main goal of contract theory has been to
design contracts that align the incentives of suppliers and retailers with those of
the centralized supply chain. This stream of literature has provided dozens of rec-
ommendations for improving supply chain efficiency assuming that decision makers
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choose parameters that maximize expected profits (Cachon 2003). A majority of
this work, as well as the current work, focuses on contracts that alleviate the re-
tailer’s risk of overstocking perishable items (e.g., buyback contracts). Although
buyback contracts have been proven to coordinate the supply chain in a general set-
ting (see Tsay (2002) and Cachon (2003)), most of this work assumes that demand
is exogenous and cannot be influenced by the retailer’s actions.
A few papers study the effects of effort dependent demand on coordinating
contracts. Cachon (2003) demonstrates that when demand can be influenced by
costly, unverifiable retailer effort, buyback, revenue sharing, and sales rebate con-
tracts fail to coordinate the supply chain. If the supplier cannot contract on retailer
effort, then these coordinating contracts will distort the retailer’s incentive for ex-
erting effort. Both Taylor (2002) and Krishnan and colleagues (2004) expand upon
these results. Taylor (2002) reaffirms that buyback and sales rebate contracts cause
a distortion of retailer effort when demand is influenced by effort, with the former
inducing too low an effort level and the latter inducing too high an effort level.
Exploiting this difference in distortion, Taylor proves that a combination of the two
contracts, although complex, can achieve coordination. Krishnan and colleagues
(2004) extend the results of Cachon (2003) by showing that effort dependent de-
mand distorts retailer effort even when the retailer can observe a signal of demand
prior to specifying an effort level. In addition, the authors establish conditions under
which constrained buyback contracts can achieve supply chain coordination. How-
ever, while these works rigorously study the adverse effects of costly effort on the
efficiency of shared risk contracts in a theoretical sense, it is unclear whether this
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potential inefficiency affects supplier preferences among contracts. Our work adds
to this stream of literature by providing a clear link between these models of effort
dependent demand and behavioral issues in practice.
In the past decade, there has been a developing interest in experimentally
studying the impact of behavioral issues on the use of supply chain contracts in
the newsvendor setting. This growing stream of literature has exposed consistent,
sub-optimal behavior in contract usage due to a variety of behavioral biases. For
example, research has examined why retailers tend to select sub-optimal order quan-
tities (i.e. pull to center bias, anchoring, loss aversion, anticipated regret) and
how these biases change across different types of contracts [Schweitzer and Cachon
(2000), Bolton and Katok (2008), Becker-Peth et al. (2010), Davis (2011), Wu
and Chen (2013)]. Other work within behavioral operations has tried to under-
stand both retailer order quantities and supplier parameter selections by having
each player interact with a computerized counterpart or in random pairs. These
works reaffirm previous results regarding retailer behavior and add to the literature
by showing that suppliers also make sub-optimal decisions (e.g., suppliers seek a
more equitable distribution of profits than theoretically predicted; Keser and Pa-
leologo (2004), Lim and Ho (2007), Ho and Zhang (2008), Katok and Wu (2009),
Kalkanci et al. (2011)). Although this research sheds light on how human decision
makers may misuse contracts, these papers quantify and characterize sub-optimal
parameter setting provided that the contract type is fixed (i.e., choice of contract is
exogenous).
In contrast to this earlier work that has examined retailer and supplier use of
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contracts, we focus on an earlier stage in the decision process: contract selection.
We highlight the fact that low retailer effort can have a deleterious effect on supplier
profits for buyback contracts, potentially explaining why suppliers often choose a
suboptimal wholesale price contract. Because retailers and suppliers often choose
among contract types prior to implementing a contract, we believe it is important
to understand which contracts suppliers prefer prior to seeing how the contract
performs. One working paper exists that begins to address this question. Zhang et
al. (2012) study supplier preferences between two, equivalent, coordinating contracts
(buyback and revenue sharing). They show that loss aversion plays an important
role in the choice between these two contracts. However, their paper makes the
assumption that the supplier has already decided to use a coordinating contract. Our
work contributes to this stream of literature by going one step back in the decision
process to understand why suppliers may prefer a wholesale price contract over a
coordinating contract. Controlling for behavioral biases such as loss aversion and
anticipated regret that affect use of contracts, we demonstrate that concerns about
effort dependent demand drive suppliers away from shared risk contracts.
1.2.2 Principal Agent Theory
The study of principal agent theory (early work includes Ross (1973)) and
related challenges such as moral hazard (early work includes Arrow (1970) and
Holmstrom (1979)) has existed for decades. Research on this topic is vast, span-
ning multiple disciplines, extensions, and research questions. Two extensions of this
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problem that have begun to receive attention within the operations context are rel-
evant to our work: (1) multitask principal agent models and (2) designing contracts
for heterogeneous agents.
Holmstrom and Milgrim (1991) were the first to address the multitask principal
agent model. Their work formalizes the problem and studies the interplay between
incentives and multiple agent tasks that require effort. A series of papers within
operations have studied a version of this model by examining incentives for salesforce
compensation when inventory considerations are present [Chen (2000), Plambeck
and Zenios (2003), Jerath et al. (2010), Saghafian and Chao (2011), Dai and Jerath
(2013)].
One general commonality in the results of this stream of literature is that often,
multiple types of incentives are needed to properly coordinate both effort decisions
and quantity decisions. Research in this area has focused on understanding the
tradeoff between effort and quantity decisions in order to design a set of incentives
that adequately incentivizes both decisions simultaneously. Various combinations of
incentives have been studied that coordinate both decisions including sales quotas,
performance rates, inventory penalties, and contract renegotiation [Zenios (2003),
Jerath et al. (2010), Saghafian and Chao (2011), and Dai and Jerath (2013]. Given
that the buyback contract is a single mechanism that incentivizes higher order quan-
tity, neglecting the impact on retailer effort, these works suggest that the buyback
contract requires further attention.
The second extension of a principal agent model that informs our work con-
siders how to design incentives when facing heterogeneous agents. Within salesforce
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compensation literature, Rao (1990) has studied how to design optimal incentives
when a firm employs a salesforce with varying degrees of skill. The findings of this
work show that a firm should offer a menu of options that specify sales quotas,
bonuses for reaching sales quotas and commission rates above and below the quota,
allowing agents to self-select into different incentive schemes. One paper in opera-
tions literature has extended this viewpoint to designing optimal contracts between
suppliers and retailers assuming that retailers are heterogeneous (Koch and Pery-
ache 2008). Koch and Peryache (2008) find that a one-size-fits-all contract can be
optimal for a supplier to offer, however, this is contingent on current incentives im-
pacting future labor markets. Just as salesperson skills may vary, so may a retailer’s
cost of exerting effort, which may impact which contract a supplier prefers to offer.
Our work draws on aspects of principal agent theory to explain supplier pref-
erences between wholesale price and buyback contracts by considering that (1) a
buyback is not a sufficient incentive when both quantity and effort decisions are
considered and (2) retailers may vary in their cost of exerting effort. We contribute
to this stream of literature by creating another link between principal agent theory
and operations management to explain infrequent use of buyback contracts among
suppliers.
1.3 Model and Hypotheses
Our goal is to understand whether the presence of costly retailer effort helps
explain a supplier’s choice between wholesale price and buyback contracts. Although
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earlier work has incorporated effort dependent demand into a supply chain setting,
[Taylor (2002), Krishnan et al. (2004), Cachon and Lariviere (2005)], research has
yet to demonstrate how optimal retailer effort changes as a function of cost of
effort potentially impacting which contract generates higher expected profits for the
supplier. Therefore, we build a model that depends on the level of costly effort
exerted by the retailer. We use this model to, first, analyze how retailer effort
is impacted by both cost of effort and the presence of a buyback (Section 1.3.2).
Then, we draw on previous results from Krishnan et al. (2004; referred to as KKB
2004 for the remainder of the paper) to demonstrate how retailer effort can affect
supplier profits, thus defining when a risk-neutral, profit-maximizing supplier should
be selecting the wholesale price contract as opposed to the buyback contract (Section
1.3.3).
The basic model studies a single, risk-neutral supplier who supplies a product
to a single, risk-neutral retailer. The supplier incurs a per unit production cost of
c > 0 and is assumed to have sufficient capacity to meet demand. The retailer faces
a fixed retail price r > c and salvage value v ≤ c. He also faces, pre-effort, stochastic
demand, ξ, that has distribution F (ξ) and density f(ξ). As in KKB 2004, f(ξ) > 0
for all ξ > 0 which allows for the claim of strict concavity, strict monotonicity, and
uniqueness of solutions. If inventories are not sufficient to fulfill demand, neither
the retailer nor the supplier suffers any penalty aside from lost revenue.
With knowledge of ξ, the retailer may exert costly effort, ρ ≥ 0, during the
season in order to increase demand. As noted in KKB 2004, we assume demand is
additively influenced by effort. Therefore effort dependent demand is ξ + ρκ ≥ ξ
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where ρ is the level of effort exerted and κ is the resulting additive increase in
demand per unit of effort. The cost of effort for the retailer is C(ρ), a convex,
increasing function that is continuously differentiable with C(0) = 0 and this cost
function is known to both the retailer and the supplier. Furthermore, we assume
that the cost of exerting effort varies by retailer and will denote the retailer’s cost
of effort with Ci(ρ).
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the supplier sets a per unit wholesale
price, w, to offer the retailer. Additionally, the supplier may choose to offer the
retailer a per-unit end-of-season payment for left over items in the form of a buyback,
b, where w > b > v. The retailer then places an order for q units and the supplier
receives revenues (w − c)q. In the same manner as KKB 2004, we assume that
both players know the retailer’s cost of effort at the time the order quantity is
placed. Therefore, the quantity and effort choice are simultaneous. The retailer
considers his individual cost of effort (Ci) and determines his order quantity (q)
based on the expected, effort dependent, regular season demand (ξ + ρκ). The
retailer then sells S(q, ρ) = q −
∫ q
0
f(y)dy units in expectation, earning expected
revenues rS(q, ρ)− wq − Ciρ.
After regular season demand, ξ + ρκ, has occurred, the retailer has expected
leftover inventory q−S(q, ρ)+. This leftover inventory generates an expected end-of-
season payment, v(q−S(q, ρ)+) under the wholesale price contract and b(q−S(q, ρ)+)
under the buyback contract. As a result, the supplier incurs an expected end-of-
season payment under the buyback contract.
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1.3.1 Assumptions for Laboratory Implementation
The general setting defined above is studied so that we may empirically test
retailer and supplier decisions experimentally. Therefore, we make two additional
assumptions before generating our hypotheses that allow us to make direct compar-
isons between the model and our experiments without compromising the robustness
of our results.
First, for both the remainder of this section and our laboratory experiments,
we will simplify effort to a discrete choice. This means that the retailer can exert
no effort, ρ = 0, resulting in no cost to the retailer and demand ξ. Alternatively,
the retailer can exert one unit of effort, ρ = 1, resulting in a cost C1 to the retailer
and demand ξ+κ, or two units of effort, ρ = 2, resulting in a cost C2 to the retailer
and demand ξ + 2κ. Since cost of effort is assumed to be convex, 2C1 ≤ C2. We
fix C1 for all retailers and let C
i
2 denote the cost of effort for a retailer with cost i.
This characterization of cost of effort is simple to explain to participants yet, does
not change the underlying structure of our defined model.
The second assumption made for the sake of laboratory experiments is that we
do not explicity study supplier-optimal contract parameters w and (wb, b). Instead,
we select a w and (wb, b) in our experiments to satisfy two conditions: (1) the retailer
earns a reasonable portion of the supply chain profits and (2) the difference in w
and wb is negligible. There are two justifications for our selection of w and (wb, b).
First, the supplier-optimal contract parameters for both contracts provide the
supplier with a large majority of the supply chain profits. The buyback contract
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can produce an infinite number of coordinating (wb, b) pairs each with a different
distribution of profits between the retailer and supplier. The supplier-optimal (wb, b)
pair gives all of the supply chain profit to the supplier. Under the wholesale price
contract, the unique supplier-optimal w distributes a large portion of the total supply
chain profits to the supplier. Previous works have shown that participants prefer a
more equitable distribution of profits (Kalkanci et al. 2011) and therefore this may
be perceived as unfair in our experiments, creating unwanted effects. In addition,
business press suggests that retailers and suppliers in practice set wholesale prices
such that retailers achieve a profit of 30% or more (Associated Press, 2005).
Second, the optimal (wb, b) and w for the supplier may be such that wb is
drastically different than w. This difference may draw participants’ attention to the
per unit price charged when selecting a contract type, creating a reference effect in
which the contract with the larger per unit price appears unfair. This unwanted
effect could complicate the analysis of our results. Additionally, business press and
our own interviews with fashion retailers and suppliers would suggest that wholesale
prices charged are similar regardless of the presence of a buyback. For example,
during our interview with the VP of Financial Planning and Analysis at a large
fashion supplier, he stated that wholesale prices are typically set as a fixed fraction
of the retail price. In addition, in explaining the negotiation process, an article
in Associated Press (2005) provides additional support for this, stating that the
wholesale price is determined prior to shipment and set as a percentage of the retail
price.
With these assumptions in mind, we explore the impact of a buyback contract
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on retailer effort when retailers have different costs of effort. We then examine the
effect of retailer effort on supplier expected profits under both the wholesale price
and buyback contract. In keeping with our laboratory assumptions, the analysis
below assumes discrete retailer effort and |w − wb| < ε with ε−− > 0. We use the
analysis to generate four potential outcomes, achieved by manipulating two factors,
for which we can make specific predictions regarding supplier preferences (see Table
1.1): (1) high cost of effort and wholesale price contract is more profitable, (2)
high cost of effort and buyback contract is more profitable, (3) low cost of effort
and wholesale price contract is more profitable, (4) low cost of effort and buyback
contract is more profitable. These four cases will allow us to study whether supplier
preferences are driven by expected profits or the level of costly retailer effort exerted.
Table 1.1: Potential Comparisons of Supplier Expected Profits
Greater Supplier Expected Profit
Wholesale Price Buyback
Retailer High Case 1: πS > π
b
S, ρ ≥ ρb Case 2: πS < πbS, ρ ≥ ρb
Effort Cost Low Case 3: πS > π
b
S, ρ = ρb Case 4: πS < π
b
S, ρ = ρb
1.3.2 The Retailer Selection of Effort and Quantity
In this setting, the retailer’s profit functions, which include effort (ρ) and cost
of effort (C1 and C
i
2) are given by (where a superscript of b denotes the buyback
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contract):
πR = −wq + rS(q, ρ) + v(q − S(q, ρ))+ − Ciρ (1.1)
πbR = −wq + rS(q, ρ) + b(q − S(q, ρ))+ − Ciρ (1.2)
We establish the retailer’s optimal level of effort and order quantity jointly. To do
this, we assume that the retailer considers all possible ρ and q pairs, and selects the
one that maximizes retailer profit. The retailer considers three pairs of decisions
when maximizing profit: (1) he can exert no effort (ρ = 0) and place the optimal
newsvendor order quantity (q or qb) assuming demand is ξ; (2) he can exert one
unit of effort (ρ = 1) and place the optimal newsvendor order quantity (q1 or q
b
1)
assuming demand is ξ + κ; or, (3) he can exert two units of effort (ρ = 2) and place
the optimal newsvendor order quantity (q2 or q
b
2) assuming demand is ξ + 2κ. Each
level of effort increases the quantity decisions (q < q1 < q2, q
b < qb1 < q
b




1, and q2 < q
b
2) but increases the retailer’s cost (C1 and C
i
2).
Observation 1.1. The retailer’s optimal level of effort, ρ̂ or ρ̂b is weakly decreasing
in cost of effort. More specifically:
• ρ̂ = 2 when Ci2 < ∆2 under the wholesale price contract (Ci2 < ∆b2 under the
buyback contract).
• ρ̂ = 1 when Ci2 > ∆2 and C1 < ∆1 under the wholesale price contract (Ci2 > ∆b2
and C1 < ∆
b
1 for the buyback contract).
• ρ̂ = 0 when Ci2 > ∆2 and C1 > ∆1 under the wholesale price contract (Ci2 > ∆b2
and C1 > ∆
b
1 for the buyback contract).
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Where the following expressions describe the breakpoints given in Observation
1.1:
∆2 = (v − w)(q2 − q1) + (r − v)(S(q2, 2)− S(q1, 1)) + C1
∆b2 = (b− w)(qb2 − qb1) + (r − b)(S(qb2, 2)− S(qb1, 1)) + C1
∆1 = (v − w)(q1 − q) + (r − v)(S(q1, 1)− S(q))
∆b1 = (b− w)(qb1 − qb) + (r − b)(S(qb1, 1)− S(qb))
It has been shown that when demand is influenced by effort, the buyback
contract is no longer coordinating because retailer decisions are not aligned with
the integrated supply chain (Taylor 2002, KKB 2004, Cachon and Lariviere 2005).
While a buyback contract is able to achieve a first best solution in the case of
random, exogenous demand, this is no longer the case when the retailer can exert
costly effort. KKB 2004 explicity show that by offering an end-of-season payment,
the supplier distorts the retailer’s incentive to exert effort, therefore decreasing (1)
the optimal retailer effort level ρ̂(i) (denoted ρ̂ for ease of exposition throughout)
and (2) the supplier’s profit for a given cost of effort (i).
We build on KKB 2004 to establish a link between retailer cost of effort (i)
optimal effort/quantity decision pairs, and subsequently, supplier profits. As the
retailer’s type (i) increases, it becomes more expensive for the retailer to exert effort
to stimulate demand. Therefore, as cost of effort increases, the retailer switches from
exerting two units of effort, ρ = 2, to one unit of effort, ρ = 1 (See Figure 1.1).
When considering profits earned under each contract, simple comparison shows
that the retailer’s profit function is always increasing in b and, in equilibrium, the
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Figure 1.1: Optimal Retailer effort (ρ̂ and ρ̂b)
For C1=100, ξ uniformly distributed on [110, 510], κ = 60, w = 40, (w
b, b) =
(40.5, 38)
retailer can be better off when a buyback contract is offered (KKB 2004). However,
Observation 1.1 shows that the optimal level of effort, ρ̂, exerted is determined by
the tradeoff between expected increase in revenue due to higher demand and order
quantity, and the cost of increasing the demand. What is left to consider is which
contract induces more retailer effort. KKB (2004) specifically show that for a fixed
w, as b increases, q̂ increases while ρ̂ decreases. Therefore, by using this single metric
of a buyback, we incentivize one retailer decision (quantity) while simultaneously
disincentivizing another (effort). For our case of discrete units of effort, we find the
same result.
As seen in Observation 1.1, the breakpoint between 0 units of effort, 1 unit
of effort, and 2 units of effort is different for each contract. The main difference
in breakpoints for contract type is the difference between b and v. Given that b is
greater than v, q1 < q
b
1, and q2 < q
b
2 we can see that the breakpoint for exerting
ρ̂ is smaller with the wholesale price contract. More specifically, the retailer exerts
2 units of effort across a larger range of costs of effort with the wholesale price
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contract than with the buyback contract. Similarly, in part (b) of Observation 1.1,
the retailer stops exerting one level of effort, reverting to no effort, over a wider
range of effort costs with the buyback contract than the wholesale price contract.
Observation 1.2. The retailer exerts a higher level of effort, ρ̂ or ρ̂b, for a greater
range of effort costs under the wholesale price contract than the buyback contract.
1.3.3 The Supplier’s Contract Choice
We will now consider how the presence of costly, retailer effort impacts supplier
expected profits and, subsequently, their choice between wholesale price and buyback
contracts. Let supplier expected profits under the wholesale price and buyback
(denoted with a superscript b) contracts, respectively, be given by:
πS = (w − c)q (1.3)
πbS = (wb − c)qb − b(qb − S(qb, ρ)+) (1.4)
In this setting (studied in KKB 2004), we observe a major downfall of the buyback
contract in a setting where demand is effort-dependent. Although the presence of
buyback increases the retailer’s optimal order quantity, q̂b, it decreases their optimal
level of effort, ρ̂b. Therefore, in our model with |w−wb| < ε and the retailer receiving
a reasonable portion of the supply chain profits, the supplier can earn a lower level
of expected profit when offering a buyback contract as opposed to a wholesale price
contract1. Thus, we see that when demand is effort-dependent (1) retailer decisions
1In a more general setting, such as that in KKB 2004, it can be the case that for any w, all
b > 0 result in lower expected profits for the supplier.
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are impacted by the cost of effort, subsequently impacting supplier expected profits
and (2) the supplier can earn lower expected profit with the buyback contract. In
light of this, we study how supplier preferences for contracts are impacted by two
factors: (1) retailer cost of effort and (2) expected profit of the contracts. By manip-
ulating two factors independently along two dimensions, we are able to determine
whether contract choice is driven by rational expected profit maximizing behavior.
With our model completely defined, we now explain how the four cases de-
scribed in Table 1.1 are constructed. Consider Case 1 when the retailer has a high
cost of effort but the wholesale price contract achieves higher expected profit (i.e.,
πS > π
b
S). Here, we have that ρ > ρb and the retailer orders q anticipating a higher
demand distribution than if placing an order for qb producing higher expected profits
for the supplier with the wholesale price contract. If we slightly alter only C2 such
that the retailer’s cost of effort still remains relatively large but, the retailer now
exerts higher effort under the buyback contract than in Case 1 (for the same w and
(wb, b)) and we now have πS < π
b
S, resulting in Case 2. If we keep all parameters the
same but significantly decrease C2 such that the retailer now has a relatively low
cost of effort, the buyback contract still outperforms the wholesale price contract
producing Case 4. Finally, keeping all else equal, if we increase the salvage value,
this increases the retailer’s order quantity under the wholesale price contract while
leaving qb as in Case 4 (since b > v). Therefore, while maintaining a low cost of




We can now make clear predictions of retailer and supplier behavior that are
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testable experimentally. Below, we formally define our hypotheses.
1.3.4 Hypotheses
Below, we present four hypotheses regarding retailer and supplier behavior
that can be used to test how the presence of costly retailer effort impacts supplier
preferences between contracts.
Observation 1.1 and previous literature (Cachon 2003, KKB 2004) suggest
that when retailer effort is a decision variable, the presence of a buyback decreases
the amount of equilibrium effort the retailer will exert. Thus, retailers should exert
lower levels of effort when presented with a buyback contract as compared to a
wholesale price contract.
Hypothesis 1.1. Retailers will exert less effort when offered the buyback contract
as compared to the wholesale price contract.
Although previous work has studied buyback contracts in the presence of costly
retailer effort (Cachon 2003, KKB 2004), our work considers heterogeneous retailers,
distinguishing between retailers who have low and high effort costs. As demonstrated
in the model above, retailer effort is decreasing in cost of effort, regardless of contract
type. Therefore, we predict that retailers will exert lower levels of effort when told
they have a high cost of effort as compared to a low cost of effort.
Hypothesis 1.2. Retailers will exert less effort when they have a high cost of effort
compared to a low cost of effort.
These predictions of retailer behavior have implications for supplier decisions.
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In determining which contract will generate greater expected profit, the supplier
must anticipate retailer decisions to accurately determine his own expected profits.
It has been theoretically shown that when offering the buyback contract, the retailer
will exert lower levels of effort than under the wholesale price contract for both
continuous (KKB 2004) and discrete forms of effort. Therefore, the rational supplier
will correctly anticipate this.
Hypothesis 1.3. Suppliers will predict a lower level of retailer effort when offering
the buyback contract as compared to the wholesale price contract.
Finally, we consider supplier preferences between the wholesale price and buy-
back contract. Theoretical results (see KKB 2004) demonstrate that when retailer
effort is a decision variable, supplier profits under the buyback contract can be ei-
ther better or worse than under the wholesale price contract. Therefore a rational,
profit-maximizing supplier will offer the wholesale price contract to the retailer when
it earns greater expected profit and will offer the buyback contract when it earns
greater expected profit. More specifically, we hypothesize that suppliers’ preferences
may be driven by expected profits.
Hypothesis 1.4a. Profit-maximizing suppliers will select the wholesale price con-
tract when πS > π
b
S and the buyback contract when πS < π
b
S, regardless of the
retailer’s cost of effort.
While the assumption of a rational, profit-maximizing decision maker is rea-
sonable, a growing stream of work in behavioral operations suggests that not all
decision makers adhere to profit-maximizing decision rules. The use of heuristics
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(i.e., mental shortcuts) by human decision makers is well documented (see Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981) for early work) especially
when tasks are complex (see Bettman, Johnson, and Payne 1991 for a review). For
example, for complex choices involving multiple attributes, decision makers may
employ a lexicographic rule (Hogarth 1990), focusing on a single attribute of the
task ignoring other attributes and potentially relevant information.
When evaluating which contract to offer, although suppliers are concerned
with expected profits, the interviews and articles discussed in Section 1.1 suggest
that suppliers also value high retailer effort. It may be difficult for a decision maker
to determine exactly when the switch in profitability occurs between the wholesale
price and buyback contract. Therefore, rather than focus on both retailer effort and
expected profits (a cognitively difficult task), the supplier may focus solely on the
outcome of retailer effort. A supplier, concerned with high retailer effort, can easily
employ an effort cost heuristic in which he links a low cost of effort (high cost of
effort) with high retailer effort (low retailer effort). Operating under this heuristic,
a supplier may choose to offer the buyback contract to the retailer only when he
anticipates high effort and the wholesale price contract when he anticipates low ef-
fort, disregarding expected profits. Therefore, supplier preferences could be driven
by an effort cost heuristic rather than expected profit.
Hypothesis 1.4b. Suppliers relying on an effort cost heuristic will be less likely to
choose the buyback contract relative to the wholesale price contract when they know
that the retailer has a high cost of effort versus when the retailer has a low cost of
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effort.
In the following sections we report three experiments conducted to test our
hypotheses.
1.4 Study 1: Retailer Effort Decisions
The theoretical results presented in Section 1.3 provide insight on how a re-
tailer makes effort decisions under both the wholesale price and buyback contract.
Therefore, in Study 1, we examine experimentally how cost of effort affects retailer
effort decisions under both types of contract.
1.4.1 Procedures
The study was conducted with 52 Master’s degree students in Supply Chain
Management at a large university in the Eastern United States who were compen-
sated via an incentive compatible lottery. Participants were randomly assigned to
a 2 (effort cost: low cost, high cost) x 2 (contract type: wholesale price, buyback)
design in which effort cost was manipulated between subjects and contract type was
manipulated within subjects. Initially, participants were told that they worked for
a fashion retail store (i.e., they were acting as the retailer) and would be purchasing
shoes from an automated supplier to sell at their store. Their task was to determine
how much effort to exert during the selling season in order to sell the shoes. This
decision was made by each participant twice, in two separate selling seasons, facing
two separate suppliers. Prior to making this effort decision, participants were given
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the following information about product cost/demand, contract type offered by the
supplier, and their own cost of effort.
1.4.1.1 Cost/Demand Information
At the beginning of each selling season, participants were presented with per
unit production cost (in francs) and demand information. Specifically, they were
told that each pair of shoes had a per unit production cost, c = 18, and could be sold
by the retailer for r = 48 with a salvage value of 8 francs. They then learned that
they face a base level of random demand, ξ, uniformly distributed over [110,510].
1.4.1.2 Contract Type
In one season, participants were told that the automated supplier offered a
wholesale price contract while in the other season the automated supplier offered a
buyback contract (order of presentation was randomized). Each contract was pre-
sented in diagram form supplemented by text (see Appendix for diagrams). In the
wholesale price condition for both high and low cost cells, participants were told
that the supplier charged w = 40 francs for wholesale price. In the buyback con-
tract condition, they were told that the supplier charged w = 40.5 per unit with a
b = 38.
Next, we told participants the order quantity for their contract type. This
quantity was set to be the optimal order quantity assuming an optimal effort deci-
sion. We automated this decision for two reasons: (1) having participants maximize
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expected profits over two variables is a much more complicated problem than over
one and (2) it would not be possible to isolate the effect of cost type on effort deci-
sions if participants selected both. Under the wholesale price contract, the retailer
purchased 310 units, regardless of their cost type. When offered the buyback con-
tract, the retailer ordered 530 units in the low cost condition (where optimally the
retailer exerted ρ̂ = 2) and 470 units in the low cost condition (where optimally the
retailer exerted ρ̂ = 1).
1.4.1.3 Retailer Effort Cost
Finally, participants were informed that during the selling season, they could
exert effort to additively increase demand, but this effort came at a monetary cost.
In all conditions, the participants faced three options. If he chose to exert no effort
(ρ = 0), this keeps the demand distributed between [110,510] and cost nothing. The
participant could exert either one or two units of effort, with each unit increasing
demand by 60 (i.e., one unit of effort results in demand [170,570] and two units
of effort results in demand [230,630]). In all conditions, one unit of effort, ρ = 1
resulted in a cost of 200 francs. The cost to exert the second unit of effort, ρ = 2,
varied by cell. In the high cost condition, the cost to exert the second unit of effort
was 455 francs (655 francs in total). In the low cost condition, the cost to exert the
second unit of effort was an additional 250 francs (450 francs in total).
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1.4.1.4 Dependent Measures
Following the presentation of information for each season, participants were
asked “what level of effort would you like to exert?” This dependent measure pro-
vided a test of both H1.1 and H1.2 which proposes that retailers exert less effort
under the buyback contract and retailers exert less effort when they have a higher
cost of effort.
In each season, after the participants made their effort decisions, demand was
randomly drawn from the appropriate distribution and profits were calculated in
terms of francs. Participants were rewarded with an incentive compatible lottery in
which the winner received $100. Each franc of profit earned increased a participant’s
probability of winning the lottery. Therefore, higher profits were linked to a greater
chance to win the $100.
1.4.2 Results
Table 2.2 displays the results of Study 1. As predicted by H1.1, participants
exerted higher levels of effort under the wholesale price contract than under the
buyback contract. While all participants in the wholesale price condition chose to
exert at least some effort (ρ =1 or 2), 19% of participants in the buyback contract
condition chose to exert no effort (ρ = 0). We conducted a 2x3x2 log-linear analysis
to examine the effects of cost type and contract type on participant effort choice
(Table 1.3).
As predicted, the interaction between cost type and effort choice indicates
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Table 1.2: Summary of Study 1 Results
Effort Choice WP Effort Choice BB N
No Low High No Low High
ρ = 0 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 0 ρ = 1 ρ = 2
High Cost 0% 52% 48% 15% 70% 15% 27
Low Cost 0% 24% 76% 24% 48% 28% 25
that, participants chose to exert more effort when cost was low as opposed to high,
confirming H1.2. The significant interaction between contract type and effort choice
indicates that as predicted by H1.1, participants chose to exert more effort under
the wholesale price contract than under the buyback contract.
Finally, the three-way interaction between cost type, effort choice, and con-
tract type demonstrates that when participants decide how much effort to exert,
their choice is significantly impacted by both their cost type and the contract offered
to them. More specifically, effort choice was less responsive to cost type when partic-
ipants were offered the buyback contract than when they were offered the wholesale
price contract. In comparing effort choices across condition for each contract, we
find that while the difference in effort choice is marginally significant between high
and low cost conditions for the wholesale price contract (χ2 = 5.68, p = 0.058), the
difference is not significant for the buyback contract (χ2 = 2.73, p = 0.255).
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Table 1.3: Retailer Effort Choices: Log Linear Analysis
G2 DF P-value
Cost type x Effort Choice 6.62 2 0.036
Cost type x Contract type 0 1 1
Effort Choice x Contract type 26.96 2 <.001
3-way interaction 34.06 7 <.001
1.4.3 Discussion
By manipulating both cost type and contract type in Study 1, we have gained
interesting insights into how retailer’s select effort under wholesale price and buy-
back contracts. We draw two conclusions from our results. First, in support of H1.1,
in both the low and high cost conditions, participants chose to exert a higher level
of effort under the wholesale price contract, with zero participants choosing to exert
ρ = 0. Second, in support of H1.2, participants chose to exert higher levels of effort
in the low cost condition, particularly for the wholesale price contract, with a large
percentage of participants choosing to exert high effort (76%).
Notably, we observe that regardless of effort cost, retailers choose to exert
consistently lower effort than is optimal. Although in the high cost condition the
majority of participants exerted the optimal effort of one unit (ρ = 1) under the
buyback contract (76%), in the low cost condition, the highest weighting was still
on one unit of effort (48%) when two units of effort is optimal. This suggests that
not only does the buyback contract incentivize a lower optimal level of effort but,
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participants exerted suboptimally lower effort levels when offered the buyback con-
tract.
For the supplier, this implies that even when, theoretically, the buyback con-
tract is the superior choice, the retailer may exert less effort than is optimal for the
supplier’s profits. Our results, therefore, suggest that the buyback contract intro-
duces expectations of lower retailer effort, lending potential support to supplier’s
revealed preference for wholesale price contracts.
Now that we understand how the presence of costly effort affects retailer deci-
sions, we can examine how the presence of costly effort affects supplier preferences.
1.5 Study 2: Supplier Contract Choice
While the majority of previous experimental work in the newsvendor setting
has focused on behavioral biases affecting sub-optimal quantity and pricing deci-
sions, one decision that has gained little attention is how suppliers choose which
contract to use. In line with the predictions made in Section 1.3, Study 2 was de-
signed to measure suppliers’ preferences between contract types as retailer cost of
effort varies, affecting which contract produces greater expected profit for the sup-
plier. Therefore, whereas Study 1 is from the retailer’s perspective, Study 2 reverses
the role of the participant.
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1.5.1 Procedures
As in our theoretical model, we compare supplier choices between wholesale
price and buyback contracts when retailers are known to have low versus high cost
and when either the wholesale price or buyback contract generates higher expected
profits. Thus, the experimental design was 2 (retailer effort cost: low cost, high
cost) x 2 (greater expected profit: wholesale price, buyback), where both effort cost
and greater expected profit were manipulated between subjects.
Study 2 was conducted with 95 participants using an online participant pool
managed by a large university in the Eastern United States. Initially, participants
were told that they worked for a woman’s shoe manufacturing company (i.e., they
were acting as the supplier) and would be selling boots to an (automated) retailer
during a single Fall selling season. Their task was to select a contract type to of-
fer the retailer. Given that the focus of the Study 2 is to gain insight about why
suppliers choose not to adopt buyback contracts, this single interaction eliminates
participant learning. Prior to selecting a contract, participants were given the fol-
lowing information about product cost/demand, retailer effort cost, and contract
types 2.
1.5.1.1 Cost/Demand Information
At the start of the season, participants were presented with per unit production
cost (in francs) and demand information. Specifically, they were told that boots had
2See Appendix for screenshots.
31
a per unit production cost, c = 18, and could be sold by the retailer for r = 48 with
a salvage value of 8 francs in the three conditions that correspond to Case 1, Case
2, and Case 4 from Section 1.3. However, in the low cost cell when the wholesale
price contract has greater expected profit (Case 3), the salvage value was listed as
21 francs. They then learned that the retailer faces random demand, ξ, uniformly
distributed over [110,510].
1.5.1.2 Retailer Effort Cost
After the cost/demand information were presented, participants were informed
that during the selling season, the automated retailer could exert effort to additively
increase demand, but this effort came at a monetary cost to the retailer. If the
automated retailer exerted no effort (ρ = 0), this kept the demand distributed
between [110,510] and cost the retailer nothing. Participants were then informed
that the automated retailer could exert either one or two units of effort, with each
unit increasing demand by 60 (i.e., one unit of effort resulted in demand [170,570]
and two units of effort resulted in demand [230,630]). In each of the four cells, one
unit of effort, ρ = 1 resulted in a cost of 200 francs. The cost of exerting the second
unit of effort, ρ = 2, varied by cell.
In Case 1, when cost of effort is high and the wholesale price contract generates
greater expected profit, the cost of exerting the second unit of effort is 455 francs
(655 francs in total). In Case 2, when the cost of effort is still high but the buyback
contract generates greater expected profit, the cost of exerting the second unit of
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effort is 445 francs (645 francs in total). When cost of effort is low, for either contract
generating higher expected profit (Cases 3 and 4), the cost of exerting the second
unit of effort was an additional 250 francs (450 francs in total). These parameters
were selected so that, under the wholesale price contract, the optimal retailer effort
is high (ρ̂ = 2) in both the low and high cost conditions. However, when offered the
buyback contract, the automated retailer optimally exerts high effort (ρ̂b = 2) when
cost is low but only one unit of effort (ρ̂b = 1) when the cost is high. Given this set
of parameters, the automated retailer was programmed to select the optimal level
of effort for the given condition as described in Table 1.4. Although participants
were not provided with this table, they were informed that the automated retailer
would behave as a risk-neutral profit maximizing agent.
Table 1.4: Summary of Optimal Retailer Decisions in Experiment
Wholesale price Greater Buyback Greater
πS > π
b
S πS < π
b
S
WP BB WP BB
High ρ̂ = 2 ρ̂b = 1 ρ̂ = 2 ρ̂b = 2
Cost q̂ = 310 q̂b = 470 q̂ = 310 q̂b = 530
Low ρ̂ = 2 ρ̂b = 2 ρ̂ = 2 ρ̂b = 2
Cost q̂ = 349 q̂b = 530 q̂ = 310 q̂b = 530
33
1.5.1.3 Contract Types
Finally, participants were presented with the two contract types they could
choose to use, a wholesale price contract or a buyback contract. Each contract was
presented in diagram form3 supplemented by text and their order of presentation
was randomized. Examples were provided for each contract to ensure familiarity.
Because our focus was contract preference rather than parameter setting, the partic-
ipants were given contract parameters for each contract (w = 40 francs for wholesale
price and w = 40.5, b = 38 for the buyback contract) as well as the optimal resulting
retailer order quantities (as summarized in Table 1.4). These contract parameters
were selected so that we could observe a flip in which contract type produced greater
expected profits in both the high and low cost conditions. If the participant offered
the retailer the wholesale price contract, the automated retailer purchases 310 units
in Case 1, Case 2, and Case 4 and 349 units in Case 3. If the participant offered
the buyback contract, the automated retailer orders 530 units when the retailer is
a low cost type (exerts ρ̂ = 2) and 470 units when the retailer is a high cost type
(exerts ρ̂ = 1).
1.5.1.4 Dependent Measures
After these pieces of information were presented, two dependent measures were
collected. First, to test H1.3, participants were asked, for both contracts, “what level
of effort do you expect the retailer to exert?” We expected suppliers to predict that
3The same diagrams from Study 1 were used in Study 2 to explain the contract types.
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retailers would exert less effort under the buyback contract than under the whole-
sale price contract. Then, to test H1.4a and H1.4b, participants were asked “which
contract would you like to offer the retailer?” H1.4a predicts that suppliers display a
stronger preference for the contract with the greater expected profit. H1.4b predicts
that suppliers would exhibit a stronger preference for the buyback contract when
the retailer has a low cost of effort as compared to a high cost of effort, regardless
of which contract produced greater profits.
At the end of the study, subjects completed four scales measuring individual
differences in (1) numeracy (Fagerlin et al. 2007), (2) anticipated regret (Kugler et
al. 2009), (3) loss aversion (Zhang et al. 2012), and (4) risk aversion (Weber et al.
2002). Previous work in experimental supply chain contracts has shown that com-
plexity, anticipated regret, risk aversion and loss aversion can affect a participants’
performance in correctly using contracts. These measures were used to control for
the effects of these individual differences on contract choice.
Once the participants responded to the dependent measures, demand was ran-
domly generated (from the appropriate distribution) and profits in terms of francs
were displayed.
1.5.2 Results
Table 1.5 and Table 1.9 present the results of Study 2 for supplier predictions
of retailer effort and supplier preferences between contracts, respectively. We will
first discuss the effects of retailer cost type and contract type on effort predictions.
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Following this, we test for significant differences in supplier contract preferences
across cost type and greater expected profit conditions.
Table 1.5: Summary of Study 2 Effort Prediction Results
Predictions for WP Contract Predictions for BB Contract
Effort No Low High Not Low High
ρ = 0 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 0 ρ = 1 ρ = 2
High Cost WP Greater 12% 56% 32% 64% 24% 12%
BB Greater 17.4% 65.2% 17.4% 52.2% 30.4% 17.4%
Low Cost WP Greater 8% 44% 48% 32% 52% 16%
BB Greater 9% 45.5% 45.5% 18.2% 63.6% 18.2%
1.5.2.1 Supplier Predictions of Retailer Effort
To test H1.3, participants were asked to predict the level of effort they thought
the retailer would exert if offered the wholesale price and buyback contract. As ex-
pected, participants predicted higher levels of effort for the wholesale price contract.
When cost of effort was high, 41 out of 48 participants predicted higher effort under
the wholesale price contract (85.4%) and when cost of effort was low, 41 out of 47
participants predicted higher effort under the wholesale price contract (85.1%). To
study this effect more rigorously, we conducted two log-linear analyses, one for the
condition when the wholesale price contract has greater expected profit and one for
the condition when the buyback contract has greater expected profit. Each log-
linear analysis is 2x2x3 (Cost of Effort x Contract Type x Effort Prediction) and
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will be used to examine the effect of contract type and cost of effort on participant
effort predictions (see Table 1.6 and 1.7).
Table 1.6: Supplier Predictions of Effort for WP Greater Condition: Log Linear
Analysis
G2 DF P-value
Cost Type x Effort Prediction 5.14 2 0.076
Cost Type x Contract Type 0.02 1 0.887
Effort Prediction x Contract Type 20.9 2 <0.0001
3-way interaction 27.78 7 0.0002
Table 1.7: Supplier Predictions of Effort for BB Greater Condition: Log Linear
Analysis
G2 DF P-value
Cost Type x Effort Prediction 6.42 2 0.04
Cost Type x Contract Type 0 1 1
Effort Prediction x Contract Type 6.72 2 0.034
3-way interaction 17.58 7 0.014
As predicted by H1.3, participants believed that retailers would exert less
effort when offered the buyback contract than when offered the wholesale price
contract, resulting in a 2-way interaction between contract type and effort prediction
for both the case when the wholesale price contract produced greater expected
profit and the buyback contract produced greater expected profit. As expected,
participants believed that effort cost would significantly affect the level of effort
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Table 1.8: Supplier Predictions of Effort Collapsing Across Expected Profit Condi-
tion: Log Linear Analysis
G2 DF P-value
Cost Type x Effort Prediction 9.14 2 0.010
Cost Type x Contract Type 0.64 1 0.424
Effort Prediction x Contract Type 29.6 2 <0.0001
3-way interaction 41.06 7 < 0.0001
exerted by retailers, resulting in a significant 2-way interaction between cost of
effort and effort prediction when the buyback contract has greater expected profit.
Although this result is only marginally significant when we limit the analysis to
those conditions in which the WP contract was more profitable, we observe the same
pattern of means regardless of which contract was more profitable. Finally, as shown
by the significant 3-way interaction among the factors in both log-linear analyses,
participants predicted larger differences between high and low cost retailers under
the wholesale price contract than under the buyback contract. No other effects were
significant. Collapsing across the expected profit condition we find similar results
(see Table 1.8).
1.5.2.2 Supplier Choice
In Table 1.9, we observe a stronger preference for the buyback contract relative
to the wholesale price contract in the low cost conditions than in the high cost condi-
tions. A chi-squared analysis shows that when either the wholesale price contract or
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Table 1.9: Summary of Study 2 Contract Choice Results
Contract Yielding Higher Expected Profit
WP BB
High 84%WP 82.6% WP
Effort 16%BB 17.4% BB
Cost Low 28% WP 27.3% WP
72% BB 72.7% BB
the buyback contract has greater expected profit, participants exhibited a stronger
preference for the buyback contract in the low cost condition than in the high cost
condition (χ2(1) = 13.72, p=0.0002) for WP greater, χ2(1) = 11.79, p=0.0006 for
BB greater. Additionally, we see that the contract with greater expected profit had
no significant impact on participant contract choices (χ2(1) = 0.07, p=0.7913) for
high cost and (χ2(1) = 0.07, p=0.7913) for low cost). Again, we conducted a 2x2x2
(Contract Choice x Effort Cost x Greater Expected Profit) to examine these effects
more closely (see Table 1.10 for results).
Table 1.10: Supplier Contract Choice: Log Linear Analysis
G2 DF P-value
Contract Choice x Effort Cost 31.74 1 <0.0001
Contract Choice x Greater Expected Profit 0 1 1
Effort Cost x Greater Expected Profit 0.02 1 0.8875
3-way interaction 31.78 4 <0.0001
As predicted by H1.4b cost of effort has a significant effect on contract selec-
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tion, as demonstrated by the significant two way interaction. Thus, participants
were significantly more likely to select the buyback contract when the retailer was
known to have low cost of effort. In contrast, participants preferred the wholesale
price contract when cost of effort was high. There is however, no significant interac-
tion between contract choice and which contract generates greater expected profit,
indicating that expected profit did not drive choices. Rather, we see evidence that
effort cost drove choices, leading us to reject H1.4a which states expected profits
drive preferences.
1.5.3 Discussion
Study 2 manipulated effort cost and expected profit of contracts between sub-
jects and contract type within subjects allowing us to test H1.3 and H1.4a/b. Par-
ticipants acting as suppliers displayed a stronger preference for the buyback contract
only when they knew the retailer’s cost of effort was low. This effect persists re-
gardless of whether or not the buyback contract produced greater profits than the
wholesale price contract. Participants predicted a lower level of retailer effort under
the buyback contract than under the wholesale price contract, suggesting that sup-
pliers fear how buyback contracts will affect retailer effort.
Most interestingly, we observe that while participants did not predict theoret-
ically optimal levels of retailer effort, their predictions are in line with actual effort
levels exerted by participants acting as retailers in Study 1. Furthermore, they se-
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lect the contract that would be more profitable assuming their effort predictions
are correct. It is possible that participants were not selecting contracts in a profit-
maximizing manner, but as demonstrated above, their estimates of retailer effort
are inaccurate. This raises the question of whether the computation of expected
profit is too difficult for participants or if they truly are using effort cost as a proxy.
To answer this question, we studied supplier contract choices as a function of their
effort predictions. We found that 65 out of the 95 participants (68.4%) selected the
contract with greater expected profit based on their own predictions of effort which
is significantly more than chance (χ2(1)=12.16, p=0.0005). These results imply
that participants are linking low cost of effort with high retailer effort and high cost
of effort with low retailer effort (even more so for the buyback contract), leading
to suboptimal contract selection. Therefore, it appears that effort drives contract
choice rather than expected profit under optimal levels of retailer effort4.
This controlled experiment with well-defined parameters provides insight but
its informational assumption is removed from many practice settings. In practice, it
may be difficult for a supplier to assess the retailer’s true cost function. Therefore,
it is not clear that we can draw parallels between our experiment and practice if we
have provided explicit cost functions. In Study 3, we examine supplier preferences
between contracts when retailer effort cost is not explicitly provided but can be
inferred indirectly by observing retailer business practices. In addition, we study
4A logistic regression was conducted to test whether contract choice was affected by numeracy,
anticipated regret, loss aversion, or risk aversion. These variables were not found to be significant
predictors of contract choice when controlling for effort cost.
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supplier preferences when no effort cost information is available at all.
1.6 Study 3: The Effect of Retailer Business Practices on Supplier
Contract Choice
Our theoretical results provide us with clear predictions regarding supplier
contract preferences when the retailer cost type is known. However, in practice,
suppliers are unlikely to have explicit information about retailer cost types when they
engage in costly effort. Earlier research has provided examples clearly indicating that
many retailers have an incentive to invest in costly promotional activities (Martin
and Collins 1991, Klein 1997). Although retailers engage in these activities, suppliers
do not typically receive explicit information about the retailer’s true cost function
and it may be difficult in practice for the supplier to assess this. In the absence of
cost type information, the supplier may be able to gather market intelligence about
the retailer’s past business practices to infer a retailer cost type.
Studies in marketing have shown that consumers are able to infer the cost of
firm advertising efforts based on identifiable elements of ad campaigns (Kirmani and
Wright 1989, Kirmani 1990). For example, Kirmani and Wright (1989) show that
consumers associate the use of “celebrities, large audience media, high frequency,
and elaborate staging” with greater advertising expenses. Rationality and profit
maximization objectives imply that retailers who engage in costly business practices
are low-cost, while those who do not are high cost. In this experiment, rather than
being given cost type explicitly, participants are presented only with evidence of the
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retailer engaging or not engaging in a series of costly retailer business practices to
stimulate demand.
1.6.1 Pretest
In order to determine whether participants infer appropriate cost types when
presented with costly retailer business practices, we conducted an empirical test
with 40 participants via an online participant pool managed by a large university
in the Eastern United States. Participants were told that Retailer 1 engaged in
the following four business practices while Retailer 2 did not: (1) sending emails
and targeted ads to customers, (2) carefully planning store layouts to maximize
foot traffic, (3) employing a sufficient staff, (4) properly training an effective and
helpful sales staff. Furthermore, subjects were instructed to view the retailers as
establishments of equal size, in the same geographic region, targeting the same
clientele. After receiving this information, participants were asked for which retailer
the promotional activities were more costly and then rated how time consuming and
expensive they believed each activity would be for the retailer on a scale of 1 to 7.
Participants were significantly more likely to infer that these business practices
were more expensive for Retailer 2 (78%) than for Retailer 1 (22%; χ2(1) = 11.02,
p<0.005). Sending ads/emails, training employees and designing an effective store
layout were judged to be significantly more time consuming than the scale mid-
point (t(38) = 10.89, p≤ 0.001). Staffing a sufficient number of employees and
training employees were deemed to be significantly more expensive than the scale
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midpoint (t(38) = 8.76, p≤ 0.01) while designing an effective store layout was rated
as marginally more expensive (t(38) = 1.54, p≤ 0.10). The results of this pretest
clearly show that subjects viewed these business practices as costly to the retailer.
Based on these results, we conclude that participants are capable of distinguishing
between high and low cost types when presented only with a description of costly
retailer business practices.
1.6.2 Procedures
Study 3 was conducted via an online participant pool managed by a large
university in the Eastern United States with 94 participants who were compensated
with a show-up fee. Participants were randomly assigned to cost types using a 3-cell
(cost type: low, control, high) between-subjects design. We compared suppliers’
contract choices when retailers employ more or less costly business practices with a
control condition in which no information was provided about the retailer’s business
practices.
The procedures of the experiment are similar to those of Study 2 with two main
differences. The description of retailer effort cost was replaced with a description
of retailer business practices and predictions of retailer effort levels were replaced
by predictions of retailer selling success. Below, we present the information that we
provided to the participants.
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1.6.2.1 Retailer Information
In the high and low effort cost conditions, participants were presented with
information regarding four pretested business practices of the retailer: (a) Sending
emails and targeted ads to customers, (b) Planning store layouts to maximize foot
traffic, (c) Employing a sufficient staff size, and (d) Properly training an effective
and helpful sales staff. Participants in the low cost condition were told that the
retailer engaged in all of these business practices, while participants in the high cost
condition were told that the retailer did not. In the control condition, it was stated
that no information was known regarding retailer business practices.
1.6.2.2 Cost and Demand Information
Participants were presented with per unit production cost (in francs) and
demand information. Parameters were chosen such that the critical ratio was 0.75,
consistent with previous research (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000). Suppliers were
selling boots with a c = 12 to a retailer with r = 48 who was facing random
demand, ξ, uniformly distributed over [200,500]. This demand distribution was
fixed and could not be altered by the retailer exerting effort.
The purpose of this experiment is to study supplier preferences for wholesale
price and buyback contracts when explicit effort cost is not present. Because the
supplier does not know the retailer’s cost of engaging in these activities, it would not
be possible for the supplier to determine if the retailer should optimally be engaging
in the activities. Therefore, we did not explicitly model costly retail effort and,
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more importantly, no statement was made to participants suggesting a link between
business practices and demand. This also allowed us to observe whether suppliers
assumed an underlying link between business practices and demand level even when
there was no actual link between the two.
1.6.2.3 Contract Types
After being informed of retailer business practices, participants were then pre-
sented with a description of the two contract types, either wholesale price or buy-
back. Each contract was presented in diagram form supplemented by text and their
order of presentation was randomized. This was followed by five hypothetical sce-
narios during which participants could opt to have demand randomly drawn and
see a comparison of the overall profits for each contract.
1.6.2.4 Dependent Measures
Participants answered dependent measures at two points in the experiment.
First, after cost/demand and retailer information was provided, participants were
asked “how many units do you expect the retailer to sell during the season?” and “on
a scale of 1 (not successful at all) to 7 (very successful) how successful do you think
the retailer will be in selling the product?”. Given that effort does not influence
demand in this experiment, the goal of these questions was to assess whether or
not participants linked business practices with increased demand. With the same
uniformly distributed demand in each of the cells, any difference in responses to
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these questions by condition would indicate an underlying assumption that effort
influences demand.
Following the description of contract types, each participant was asked “which
contract would you prefer to use?” After participants selected either the wholesale
price or buyback contract, they were asked to provide an open-ended description to
“explain why you chose this contract.” Following the contract choice, actual demand
was randomly generated and participants were shown a calculation of their overall
season profits, given their contract choice.
1.6.2.5 Scales
At the end of the study, subjects completed four scales that gauged individual
differences in (1) numeracy (Fagerlin et al. 2007), (2) anticipated regret (Kugler
et al. 2009), (3) loss aversion (Zhang et al. 2012), and (4) risk aversion (Weber et
al. 2002). Previous work in experimental supply chain contracts has shown that
complexity, anticipated regret, risk aversion and loss aversion can affect a subject’s
performance in correctly using contracts. These measures were used to control for
the effects of these individual factors on contract choice.
1.6.3 Results
The results of Study 3 are presented in Table 1.11 below. Confirming that
participants did associate higher levels of demand with costly retailer business prac-
tices, participants estimated that the number of units each retailer would sell (see
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the column labeled “Sales Estimate”) are significantly different. We find that the
high cost condition generates significantly lower sales estimates than the control
(t(60) = 2.12, p=0.037) and the control condition is significantly lower than the low
cost condition (t(63) = 3.45, p=0.001). This gives the following ordering: high cost
estimate ≤ control estimate ≤ low cost estimate. Similarly, participants predicted
that the retailer would be more successful (see the column labeled “Success Rat-
ing”) when the retailer was described as having low costs than when the retailer was
described as having high costs or no business practice information was provided.
1.6.3.1 Choice
Preferences were significantly higher for the buyback contract when the retailer
was described as engaging in costly business practices as compared to not engaging
in them (χ2(1) = 4.67, p=0.031), supporting the results of Study 2. Interestingly, we
find that preferences in control condition do not significantly differ from the high cost
condition (χ2(1) = 0.03, p=0.863) indicating that providing no information about
business practices results in the same contract preferences as explicitly stating that
the retailer does not engage in any business practices to stimulate demand. Contract
choices in the control condition are marginally different from the low cost condition
(χ2(1) = 3.12, p=0.07) suggesting that participants are slightly more likely to offer
the buyback contract when explicitly told that retailers engage in costly business
practices.
Finally, we find no evidence of contract choices systematically differing by the
48
individual factors we collected (loss aversion, risk aversion, anticipated regret, and
numeracy). We ran logistic regression on the likelihood of choosing a buyback con-
tract as a function of loss aversion, risk aversion, anticipated regret, and numeracy.
Controlling for the effects of condition, none of these variables significantly predicted
contract choice.
Table 1.11: Summary of Study 3 Results
Prediction of Retailer Performance Contract Choice N
Sales Estimate Success Rating Chose WP Chose BB
Low Cost 383.17 5.41 64% 36% 32
(67.69) (0.95)
Control 329.18 4.32 85% 15% 33
(54.13) (1.02)
High Cost 294.77 3.79 89% 11% 29
(75.89) (1.11)
1.6.3.2 Open-Ended Responses
In addition to our quantitative dependent measures, we collected open-ended
responses from participants to better understand the reasoning behind their choices.
These responses were found to contain four distinct justifications for contract
choice: (1) risk aversion, (2) retailer motivation/business practices, (3) greater prof-
its, (4) contract was better/easier/more familiar. Please see Table 1.12 for examples
of responses coded in each category.
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Table 1.12: Sample Open Ended Responses
Selected WP Selected BB
Risk Aversion
A sure thing is far more safe than
an unknown. Although you might
be able to make more money with
the other choice they key word
here is MIGHT or MIGHT NOT




As stated earlier, the retailer does
not market, is understaffed, and
has poor customer service. I
wouldn’t expect the demand to be
strong, so there would be more
leftover. In that case, a Whole-
sale Price contract would be more
beneficial.
I would expect that highland
fashions is able to sell the ma-
jority of boots. Demand does
not have to be too high to make
more money this way. Since High-
land Fashions has a reputation
for marketing its products, they
should have no problem selling
the majority of the boots.
Greater Profits
It is more likely I will get the most
profit.
I chose this contract because the





I don’t want to deal with what
actual demand is. This is easier.
Seems better for both companies
given conditions shown.
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All open ended responses were coded by three independent coders (Fleiss’s
κ=0.83 5, see Table 1.13). Each response was assigned to one of the four categories
and disagreements were resolved by majority rule. We observe that while context
specific risk aversion6 was the top reason for selecting the wholesale price contract,
retailer motivation/business practices was a greater concern in the control and high
cost type conditions than in the low cost type condition. Additionally, we see that
the top reason for selecting the buyback contract in the high effort condition was
retailer motivation/business practices. This evidence further supports our prediction
that suppliers are averse to entering into buyback contracts when the retailer does
not engage in costly business practices to stimulate demand.
1.6.3.3 Discussion
Study 3 used retailer business practices as a proxy for retailer cost of effort to
create a setting more closely linked to practice. When we manipulate perceived ef-
fort cost by describing retailer business practices, we see similar patterns in contract
preferences to that of Study 2. Most notably, when suppliers had no information
about retailer effort costs (in the control condition), they seemed to assume the
worst. They predicted lower levels of retailer success when provided with no in-
formation regarding retailer business practices than when told the retailer engaged
in costly business practices to increase demand. This prediction of lower retailer
5See Fleiss 1971 for a description of Fleiss’ κ.
6Although the measure for individual level of risk aversion is not significant in predicting con-
tract choice, context specific aversion to immediate profit risk appeared to be a concern.
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Table 1.13: Summary of Study 3 Open Ended Responses
Risk Retailer Greater Better/
Aversion Motivation Profit Easier/
Business Familiar
Practices
Low Cost 51% 8% 20% 21%
Preference Control 54% 22% 9% 15%
for WP High Cost 19% 34% 36% 11%
Low Cost 6% 59% 29% 6%
Preference Control 0% 11% 56% 33%
for BB High Cost 0% 12% 50% 38%
success translated into similar contract preferences in the control condition and the
condition in which the retailer did not engage in costly business practices (i.e., a
stronger preference for the buyback contract). Thus, lack of information may result
in an unwillingness to engage in risk sharing with the retailer. If effort was not
a concern for suppliers, they should have preferred the buyback contract when no
mention of retailer effort was made (as predicted by Cachon 2003).
This finding has significant implications for suppliers in practice. Because
preferences in the control conditions favored wholesale price contracts, we can con-
clude that effort is an inherent concern when there is uncertainty surrounding cost
of effort. Therefore, retailers who do exert costly effort to sell items will be well
served by being forthcoming about their business practices; open communication
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between retailers and suppliers can be beneficial to both parties.
1.7 Conclusion
The primary goal of this research is to provide insight into why wholesale
price contracts dominate the practitioner’s landscape, as opposed to coordinating
contracts such as buyback contracts. We propose that despite their theoretical supe-
riority, suppliers are reluctant to use buyback contracts because they are concerned
that retailers will exert less effort when operating under a buyback contract than
under a wholesale price contract. When retailers are able to influence demand by
investing in costly effort, our analytical model shows that retailers will exert less ef-
fort when faced with a buyback contract than a wholesale price contract. Moreover,
study 1 demonstrates that retailers choose to exert systematically less effort under
a buyback contract than under a wholesale price contract. Thus, we find empirical
support for our predictions about retailer reactions to different contract types.
Our analytical model suggests that profit-maximizing suppliers should consider
retailers’ effort decisions when choosing among contracts to offer retailers. Studies 2
and 3 test our predictions regarding supplier preferences between contracts, demon-
strating that retailer cost of effort has the predicted impact on supplier preferences.
Our empirical results show that suppliers prefer the buyback contract only when the
retailer is known to have a low cost of effort. Furthermore, we find that regardless
of whether the cost of effort is known to be high or is unknown, suppliers predict
lower retailer effort and we observe a decrease in supplier preferences for the buy-
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back contract. These effects persist whether cost of effort is provided explicitly or
inferred through retailer business practices.
One potential question raised is whether or not there is something unique
about the buyback contract that is producing these results. As a follow-up to Study
3, we conducted an experiment in which we presented participants with a choice
between the wholesale price contract and another form of contract with similar sup-
plier risk-sharing: the markdown money contract. When using a markdown money
contract, the supplier agrees to subsidize the retailer’s profit margin on items sold at
a discount. While this type of contract has been shown to be theoretically equivalent
to the buyback contract (Tsay 2002), the framing is different. Similar to Study 3,
the retailer’s business practices were described as either low cost, high cost, or un-
known (control). In this study (N=90), we find the same pattern of supplier contract
preferences. There is a significantly stronger preference for the markdown money
contract when the retailer’s description of business practices is consistent with a low
cost retailer (40% selected markdown money) versus high cost (10% selected mark-
down money, χ2(1)=5.69, p=0.02) or control (13% selected markdown, χ2(1)=4.18,
p=0.04). As in Study 3, preferences did not differ between the control and high
cost conditions (χ2(1)=0, p=1) demonstrating that suppliers are pessimistic when
provided with no cost information.
We contribute to theoretical work in supply chain management by extending
previous results to study supplier choices among contracts when retailers are hetero-
geneous. While other work has examined supplier preferences between coordinating
contracts (Zhang et al. 2012), we are the first to examine specific factors that may
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influence supplier preferences between a wholesale price contract and a coordinating
contract.
In addition, we add to theoretical work highlighting the negative impact of
effort dependent demand on buyback contracts by demonstrating these results ex-
perimentally. We show that these negative effects are a real concern when explaining
retailer decisions and supplier preferences in a supply chain settings. We find that
both retailer effort and supplier contract choice are impacted by two factors: (1)
cost of effort and (2) contract type. As effort cost increases, we see retailers exerting
less effort and suppliers favoring the wholesale price contract. Additionally, our re-
sults demonstrate that not only do suppliers predict lower levels of effort under the
buyback contract, but participants acting as retailers actually exert lower levels of
effort. Interestingly, regardless of which contract has a higher expected profit, the
supplier prefers the buyback contract only when facing a retailer known to have a
low cost of effort .
Our results provide many opportunities for extensions. One extension is to
look at a multi-period setting. In our experiments, participants were explicitly told
they were dealing with a retailer for a single season. We do not consider the situation
in which retailers and suppliers engage in a repeated game, potentially forging rela-
tionships and learning the retailer’s cost of effort over time. Although the potential
for repeated interactions may reduce the size of the effect found, our industry in-
terviews suggest repeated interactions do not eliminate its effect. The retailers and
suppliers with whom we spoke interact with most of their partners on a repeated
basis, yet they still predominantly use wholesale price contracts.
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A second direction for future work is to allow communication between the re-
tailer and supplier during the selling season. We have found that in practice, it is
common for suppliers and retailers to be in contact throughout the selling season. In
fact, of the three firms we interviewed who did use some form of buyback contract,
all of them communicated with their clients during the season to discuss current
sales and marketing strategies. This suggests that allowing suppliers to observe re-
tailer activities and sales, as well as make suggestions, might increase preferences
for buyback contracts.
Another potential direction for future research is to consider additional in-
centive schemes. We note that while the buyback contract increases retailer order
quantity, it decreases retailer effort. Research on compensation schemes suggests
that multiple incentives may be required as opposed to using only a buyback price
to incentivize higher order quantities [Chen (2000), Plambeck and Zenios (2003),
Chen (2005), Jerath et al. (2010), Saghafian and Chao (2011) ,Dai and Jerath
(2013)]. It would be interesting to theoretically explore combinations of incentives
that increase both retailer order quantity and effort decisions and then test their
effectiveness empirically.
In summary, our results provide strong evidence for the connection between
retailer effort costs and supplier contract preferences. This connection provides im-
portant insights for both suppliers and retailers. When choosing among contracts,
suppliers should take into account the effort that retailers will exert to stimulate
demand. Because effort costs vary, so does the optimality of particular contract
types across market settings. Retailers, on the other hand, should be very open in
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disclosing their efforts to stimulate demand. As seen in Section 1.3, the retailer is
better off when offered a buyback contract but, as Study 3 demonstrates, the sup-
plier is unwilling to offer the buyback contract when he has no information about the
retailer’s business practices. Moreover, if the retailer exerts high effort to stimulate
demand, both the supplier and retailer can be better off using a buyback contract
than using a wholesale price contract. There are many industries, even outside of
fashion retailing, that can benefit from shared risk contracts. If we can understand
factors that make these contracts more attractive to suppliers as well as retailers,
we can improve contract efficiency for both parties.
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Chapter 2: The Effect of Contract Type on Risky Product Related
Decisions
2.1 Introduction
Unlike the traditional wholesale price contract, in which the retailer bears
the risk of unsold inventory, shared risk contracts such as the buyback contract
theoretically achieve supply chain coordination by allowing the supplier to share
the retailer’s risk. When using a buyback contract, the supplier offers to buy back
leftover inventory from a retailer at some price less than the initial price. This
encourages the retailer to order a larger quantity, creating higher expected profits
for both parties (see Cachon 2003 for a review).
Although theoretical research has shown that shared risk contracts increase
the quantity purchased by the retailer, it is less clear how contracts such as the
buyback contract will affect the retailers choices when selecting which products to
stock. If we consider a retailer making a joint decision about which products to
order and the quantity of each product to order (Van Ryzin and Mahajan 1993) in
a typical newsvendor setting, the retailer must manage two different kinds of risk:
quantity risk and product risk. We define quantity risk as the contribution to profit
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variance that comes from ordering a smaller or large quantity of a given product.
In contrast, we define product risk as the contribution to profit variance due to
variability in demand across products that may be ordered.
Imagine that the retailer can choose among multiple products that vary on
attributes such as color and shape. Even if these products are similar in cost or
retail price, the product risk the retailer incurs may differ due to variations in
their attributes. For example, women‘s leather handbags may be offered in basic
black (low demand variability), or in a bold, multicolored pattern (high demand
variability). A product with higher demand variability leads to greater variance in
expected profit when the quantity purchased is held constant. Thus, the retailer
assumes more product risk by choosing to stock the bold, multicolored handbag
than by choosing to stock the basic black handbag.
In this research, we examine how the use of a shared risk contract such as
the buyback contract affects the retailers willingness to assume product risk. Since
the retailers expected losses if the product does not sell well are lower under the
buyback contract than under a wholesale price contract, we might expect that a
buyback contract would encourage retailers to assume more product risk by stocking
products with more demand variability, all else equal.
Surprisingly, we find quite consistent evidence that retailers are willing to as-
sume less product risk when using a buyback contract than when using a wholesale
price contract, independent of their decisions about order quantity. In several pi-
lot studies, we asked participants acting as retailers to choose whether to stock a
product with high demand variability or a product with low demand variability,
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holding order quantity constant. Participants were offered either a wholesale price
contract or a buyback contract and they made a series of product choice decisions
across independent periods. Participants who were offered a wholesale price con-
tract were strongly and systematically more willing to choose products with high
demand variability than those who were offered a buyback contract.
Behavioral decision theory offers some insight into this surprising pattern of
retailer preferences. Empirical research has shown that when making choices un-
der uncertainty, decision makers not only segregate losses and gains, but they also
differentially weigh small probabilities relative to large probabilities, affecting their
choices (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The retailers choice between products with
high and low demand variability is essentially a choice between profit streams with
different ranges and probabilities of losses and gains. When order quantity is held
constant, the low demand variance option offers smaller variance in profits, while
the high demand variance option offers a greater probability of obtaining high levels
of profit but a greater probability of incurring a loss. For a given order quantity a
buyback contract creates a systematically lower probability and magnitude of loss
relative to a wholesale price contract. Combining the effects of contract type and
product choice, the buyback contract reduces the probability of loss, but does so
differentially for high versus low demand variance products. Specifically, the buy-
back contract increases the perceived difference in losses when comparing products
with high and low demand variance.
Based on this insight, we propose an analytical model in which the retailer
compares the expected losses and gains for each product, assuming either a wholesale
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price or buyback contract. This model allows for a differential weighting of small
and large probabilities consistent with Prospect Theory. We then compare the
predictive power of this model to a rational model in which the retailer chooses
among products based on their expected profits. We find that our model based
on Prospect Theory better predicts the product choices of participants acting as
retailers than the expected profit model. Our model better predicts choices across
a range of relative losses and gains (Study 1) and when participants make joint
decisions about products and the quantities of each product (Study 2).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we re-
view relevant literature on supply chain contracts, retail assortment planning, and
behavioral decision theory. Section 2.3 presents an analytical model of product
choice given contract type from the perspective of a rational, risk neutral retailer
and presents the results of our pilot study. Based on these results, we propose a
model of product choice based on Prospect Theory that incorporates differential
weighting of small and large probabilities of losses or gains. We explicitly test these
two models of behavior in Section 2.4 with an experiment in which retailers decide
which product mix to stock for a given contract type. In Section 2.5, we report
a second experiment in which quantity is also a decision (a true retail assortment
planning decision) as a robustness test. The results of our second study are consis-




Our research brings together several relevant streams of literature. In studying
the impact of contract type on product selection decisions experimentally, we are at
the interface of current behavioral operations work on supply chain contracts and
theoretical operations work on retail product assortment. In addition, we connect to
the broader field of behavioral decision theory which studies how decision makers are
impacted by behavioral biases when faced with choices under uncertainty. Below, we
review both product assortment literature and relevant behavioral decision theory
in order to highlight our contribution.
2.2.1 Retail Product Assortment
The retailer’s decision of what mix of products to stock has been studied in
both marketing and operations. Both streams of literature focus on understanding
how a retailer should select which products to stock in response to consumer pref-
erences and buying behavior. Marketing research on the topic is vast and began
decades ago with the earliest being Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Moorthy (1984).
However, research on the topic from an operations viewpoint has expanded rapidly
only in recent years and is the stronger connection to our research [Van Ryzin and
Mahajan (1999), Cachon, Terwiesch and Xu (2005), Gaur and Honhon (2006), Caro
and Gallien (2007), Kok and Fisher (2007), Nagarajan and Rajagopalan (2008),
Aydin and Hausman (2009), Honhon et al. (2012)].
Van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) were the first to theoretically consider choice
62
models in retail assortment planning. Their model integrates consumer choice (de-
fined by MNL) with the newsvendor problem to balance the benefits of product
variety with the operational costs of stockouts and overages. Using a basic model
with products having identical costs and prices but different demand means and
variances, they search for optimal assortments that maximize retailer profit. Their
findings show that the optimal mix always includes the most popular product vari-
ant. Gaur and Honhon (2006) expand upon this work by considering a different
functional form of consumer demand, showing that an optimal assortment may not
include the most popular product and may force some consumers not to purchase.
Further work has enriched the results of Van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) by
increasing the complexity of the retail assortment planning problem. Cachon, Ter-
wiesch and Xu (2005) consider how optimal assortments are affected in the presence
of consumer search. Nagarajan and Rajagopalan (2008) and Kok and Fisher (2007)
examine how to make the joint decision of what to stock and how much to stock when
products are substitutable. Caro and Gallien (2007) consider a dynamic assortment
in which they allow demand learning over time. Honhon and colleagues (2012) con-
sider optimal assortments after relaxing the assumption that product prices and
costs are identical. Finally, Aydin and Hausman (2009) consider the ability of al-
ternate payment structures, such as slotting fees, to coordinate the supply chain in
the presence of multiple products.
While this research has focused on reducing the retailer’s product risk by ac-
curately predicting consumer product choices, it has not examined the effect of
contract type on the retailer’s willingness to accept product risk. Our research adds
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to this stream of literature by being the first to examine retail product assortment
decisions from a behavioral angle and by expanding the lens through which we view
retail product assortment to include the contract offered to the retailer.
2.2.2 Behavioral Decision Theory
The idea that human decision makers are boundedly rational was first proposed
by Simon in 1955. In the decades following, behavioral decision theory emerged as a
field that studies human decision makers deviations from normative decisions (Ein-
horn and Hogarth 1981). Numerous streams of literature have incorporated the
presence of behavioral biases in decision making under uncertainty. Specifically,
a number of heuristics and biases have been identified when decision makers face
choices with uncertain financial outcomes, such as loss aversion, risk aversion, and
Prospect Theory [Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Kahneman and Tversky (1979)].
These biases and heuristics have been researched both theoretically and experimen-
tally in decision contexts similar to the research question we consider.
Work within the supply chain management area of behavioral operations has
studied the impact of various biases on retailer and supplier decisions from both a
theoretical and experimental viewpoint. In a review of supply chain contract models,
Tsay, Nahimas, and Agrawal (1999) call for future research that considers suppli-
ers/retailers who maximize objective functions other than profits. Since that time,
the supply chain literature has produced models incorporating biases such as risk
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aversion and loss aversion into inventory related decisions [Lau and Lau (1999), Gan
et al. (2004), Wang and Webster (2007), Wei and Choi (2010)]. These papers intro-
duce the concept of profit variance, suggesting that decision makers are impacted
by both expected profits and the distribution of those profits. However, this body
of work has focused on the impact of order quantity on profit variance. In contrast,
our work studies how retailers can alter profit variance by selecting products with
different variances in their demand distributions.
Although supply chain and retail product assortment literature have not speci-
ficially addressed the impact of behavioral biases on retailer product choice, analo-
gous decisions have been examined in another field. The field of behavioral finance
studies investor behavior over a wide range of decision contexts. Two decisions in
particular are relevant to our research questions: (1) how do investors decide among
investments, and (2) how do they determine how much to invest in each invest-
ment? In relation to these questions, behavioral finance examines the presence of
many of the same biases studied in behavioral operations (e.g., overconfidence, loss
aversion, framing, anchoring). The findings from this literature provide further evi-
dence that decision makers are susceptible to biases by demonstrating that investors
are similarly influenced by them [surveys: Kahneman and Riepe (1998), Benartzi
and Thaler (2003), Ricciardi (2008), Barber and Odean (2011)]. Numerous biases
related to Prospect Theory have been found to affect an investor’s decision of how
much to invest in a risky asset [Weber and Camerer (1998), Benartzi and Thaler
(1999), Charness and Gneezy (2010)]. Weber and Camerer (1998) find that par-
ticipants exhibit a disposition effect when deciding when to buy and sell assets by
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holding investments that have lost value and selling investments that have gained
value. Benartzi and Thaler (1999) find experimentally that participants allocate sig-
nificantly more money to risky assets when losses are aggregated over a long period
rather than a shorter time period in which fluctuations are highlighted. Charness
and Gneezy (2010) show that participants exhibit myopic loss aversion, investing
less in risky assets when they receive feedback more frequently. This growing field
of research provides further evidence suggesting that behavioral biases may impact
retailer product choice.
While work on behavioral decision theory is vast, researchers have yet to study
how contract type may alter retailer product choice due to behavioral biases. There-
fore we draw upon the biases that behavioral decision theory has identified to extend
research on product assortment and supply chain contracts.
2.3 Model and Hypotheses
Our basic model focuses on a single risk-neutral retailer who purchases from
a single risk-neutral supplier. In keeping with Van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999), the
supplier offers two products from the same product class to the retailer that have
identical retail prices. In addition, the supplier will offer the same per unit price for
each product to the retailer (i.e., r > w > 0 is the same for both). Let us refer to
these products as the low product risk product, with demand DS, drawn from known
demand distribution FS(x), and the high product risk product, with demand DR,
drawn from known demand distribution FR(x). For simplicity, we assume that both
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the low and high product risk products have equal demand means (i.e., µS = µR)
and differ only in their demand variance with σ2S < σ
2
R.
We will define our setting by the following sequence of events. First, a supplier
sets the terms of an exogenously determined contract type. This means, the supplier
will set a per unit wholesale price, w, if offering the retailer the wholesale price
contract. If offering the buyback contract, he will additionally offer the retailer a
per unit end-of-season payment for left over items, b, where w > b > 0. After the
retailer receives the terms of the supplier’s contract, he selects a product to order,
taking on a certain level of product risk, and selects an order quantity, q. This
provide expected sales of ES(q)=q −
∫ q
0




fR(y)dy for the high product risk product.
After regular season demand has occurred, the retailer has expected leftover
inventory q − ES(q) or q − ER(q) that can be returned to the supplier for b per
unit if the supplier has offered a buyback. If the retailer has not been offered a
buyback, we assume that the salvage value is $0. This sequence of events leads
to expected profits of πS = rES(q) − wq for the low product risk product and
πR = rER(q)−wq for the high product risk product if operating under the wholesale
price contract. Similarly, if operating under the buyback contract, the retailer faces
expected profits of πS,b = rES(q) − wq + b(q − ES(q)) with the low product risk
product and πR,b = rER(q)−wq+ b(q−ER(q)) with the high product risk product.
In this context, we would like to study retailer behavior for the single, isolated
decision of the proportion of the high product risk product the retailer chooses to
stock. To do this, we simplify our setting by making two additional assumptions:
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(1) the combined order quantity for both products is fixed, referred to as Q, and (2)
the per unit wholesale price charged under both contracts is the same, referred to as
W . The assumption of a fixed order quantity allows us to study how contract type
affects only the level of product risk the retailer assumes rather than the combination
of product risk and quantity risk. The assumption of a fixed per unit wholesale price
allows us to examine the impact of the buyback’s introduction on the retailer’s level
of product risk rather than the combined effect of simultaneously changing the per
unit price and introducing a buyback. These assumptions provide us with as much
control as possible in ruling out alternative explanations in our experiments.
With Q and W exogenously determined, the retailer will make the decision
of how to allocate Q between both products by assigning a fraction α to the high
product risk product and (1 − α) to the low product risk product. His expected
profits for the wholesale price contract as a function of α are given by:
Π(α) = [rES((1− α)Q)−W (1− α)Q] +
[rER(αQ)−WαQ]
Similarly, his expected profits as a function of α for the buyback contract are given
by:
Πb(α) = [rES((1− α)Q)−W (1− α)Q+ b((1− α)Q− ES((1− α)Q))] +
[rER(αQ)−W (α)Q+ b((α)Q− ER(αQ))]
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We will examine theoretically and experimentally how the presence of a buy-
back may impact the retailer’s decision, α. We will begin by reviewing optimal
behavior assuming that the retailer’s utilities are defined by expected profits where
α is the argmax[Π(α)] for the wholesale price contract and argmax[Πb(α)] for the
buyback contract. Given the sequence of events presented above and a fixed or-
der quantity, a profit maximizing retailer should optimally select an α = 0 when
Π(0) > Π(1) and an α = 1 when Π(0) < Π(1). Given that a buyback contract
decreases the chance of loss for both products in comparison to the wholesale price
contract when order quantity is fixed, this optimal α is the same, regardless of con-
tract type. Therefore, we can study how the retailer’s choice of α changes as a
function of the expected profits from the high and low product risk products.
If their goal is to maximize expected profits, participants playing the role of
a retailer, should select α based on the products’ expected profit levels. Therefore
we can create an expression for α that allows us to estimate the impact of expected
profits on the fraction of the high product risk product the retailer decides to stock.
Let ∆EP = Π(1) − Π(0) (∆EPb = Πb(1) − Πb(0)) be defined as the difference in
expected profit between the high and low product risk product for the wholesale
price contract (buyback contract). Generally, when ∆EP (∆EPb) is positive (i.e.,
the high product risk product has a greater expected profit), α should increase.
Conversely, when ∆EP is negative (i.e., the low product risk product has a greater
expected profit), α should decrease. We can summarize this conclusion with Equa-
tion 2.1 presented below where IBB represents an indicator variable for the buyback
contract and βEP and βBB represent the coefficients of ∆EP and IBB respectively.
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α = (1− βBBIBB)βEP∆EP + βBBIBB(βEP∆EPb) (2.1)
Given this representation of α and assuming a profit maximizing retailer, we
predict that βEP is positive and βBB is insignificant. This would lead to an α = 1
when the high product risk product has greater expected profit, an α = 0 when the
low product risk product has greater expected profit, and no effect of contract type
(i.e., the participants’ choice of α should be increasing in ∆EP .
It is possible that decision makers are not selecting α in a profit maximizing
manner but rather are influenced by another aspect of the decision setting. In addi-
tion to expected profits, previous literature has explored the role of profit variance in
a decision maker’s assessment of choices. This implies that decision makers are im-
pacted by the distribution of their profits which may lead to decisions driven by risk
aversion or Prospect Theory (i.e., loss aversion or probability weighting functions).
As noted in Section 2.1, we can draw parallels between the retailer’s product choice
decision and choosing between gambles where both probabilities and magnitudes of
losses and gains influence choices. To investigate this explanation, we consider the
effect of product risk on the profits generated under each product for each contract.
Prior literature has studied profit variance as a function of the retailer’s or-
der quantity, q [Wu et al. (2008), Choi et al. (2008), Choi et al. (2009), Wei
and Choi (2010)] . Given that we fix Q in our model, we will study profit vari-
ance in as it changes with FS(x) and FR(x). We study the impact of product risk
while holding quantity risk constant. Therefore, we define profit variance under
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each contract and examine how profit variance changes as a function of product
type for each contract. In keeping with prior literature (Wei and Choi 2010), we
define the variance in profit by determining the variance in the random variable S(q)
(i.e., the variance in sales). This gives a profit variance of σ2(π) = r2ν(q)2 for the











Under a fixed order quantity, the variance in expected sales, S(Q), is larger
for the high product risk product than for the low product risk product because
σ2R > σ
2
S, νR(Q) > νS(Q). Said another way, the high product risk product has
a higher chance of low levels of demand but also a higher chance of high levels of
demand. This product risk translates directly into the variance of sales and thus,
into the variance of the retailer’s profits. Controlling for the order quantity placed
by the retailer, the high product risk product increases the probability of achieving
very high levels of profit while at the same time opening the retailer up to a greater
chance of low levels of profit (or loss).
Next, we compare product risk under the wholesale price and buyback con-
tract. In comparing σ2(π) with σ2(πb), we see that the buyback contract has a
systematically lower level of profit variance, and therefore product risk, regardless
of the product type. The presence of a buyback systematically decreases the proba-
bility the retailer incurs a loss. Therefore, when the supplier offers to engage in risk
sharing with the retailer by offering the buyback contract, the retailer may respond
by displaying a stronger preference for the high demand variability product, regard-
less of expected profits. To test whether retailer preferences are driven by expected
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profits, as the rational model would suggest, we conduct a pilot study.
2.3.1 Pilot Study
The pilot study was conducted with 126 participants via Amazon Mturk who
were were paid for participation. In addition, participants had the opportunity to
earn a bonus based on performance. All participants were told they would place
an order for a fixed quantity to stock in their retailer kiosk. Their task was to
decide whether to stock the low or high product risk product. Our experimental
design was 2 (contract type: wholesale price, buyback) x 2 (visual presentation:
table, graph) with both factors manipulated between subjects. In keeping with Van
Ryzin and Mahajan (1993), our decision setting featured two products with equal
cost, retail price and expected demand. However, one product was characterized by
low product risk and one was characterized by high product risk. Each participant
made a series of 24 decisions. For each decision, participants were given the terms
of a contract (either wholesale price or buyback for all 24 decisions), the product
category and the fixed quantity that they would order (the same quantity for either
product option).
Prior to making their selection decision, participants were provided with in-
formation regarding the expected profit of each product option. In addition, par-
ticipants were also provided with the probability of earning maximum profit, and
probability of incurring a loss for both the low and high product risk product. This
information was selected to be consistent with available information supplied by in-
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ventory management software programs such as NetSuite. To manipulate the visual
presentation of this information, participants saw either a table (see Figure 2.1) or
a graph (see Figure 2.2). For all 24 decisions, the low product risk product had a
higher expected profit and lower probability of incurring a loss but the high product
risk product had a higher probability of earning maximum profit.
Figure 2.1: Screen Shot from Table Condition of Pilot Study
Figure 2.2: Screen Shot from Graph Condition of Pilot Study
While one might expect that a rational, risk-neutral retailer would select the
product with greater expected profit (set as the low product risk product for all
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decisions) regardless of contract type, this is not what we observed. In the whole-
sale price condition, we observed a consistent preference for the high product risk
product while in the buyback condition we observed a consistent preference for the
low product risk product. In the table condition, we observed that on average, par-
ticipants selected the high product risk product 65% of the time when offered the
wholesale price contrast and 30% of the time when offered the buyback contract.
Product choice behavior differed significantly in 17 out of the 24 decision periods.
Similarly, in the graph condition, we observed that on average, participants selected
the high product risk product 61% of the time when offered the wholesale price
contract and 33% of the time when offered the buyback contract. In this condition,
product choice behavior was significantly different in 18 out of the 24 decision peri-
ods (see Table 2.1).
These results indicate that contract type had an impact on product choice,
whether information was presented in table or graph form. Participants acting as
retailers showed a clear preference for the high product risk product when they were
offered the wholesale price contract. We replicated these results in a second pilot
study with 52 MBA students at a large mid-Atlantic university where information
regarding the two options was presented only in table form. Results of this second
pilot study revealed similar preference structures with participants selecting the high
product risk product 68% of the time on average in the wholesale price condition and
36% of the time on average in the buyback condition. Not only does this violate
rational, risk neutral behavior, but we also found that, surprisingly, the buyback
contract leads to lower levels of retailer product risk as opposed to our prediction
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of higher levels of product risk. To investigate this counterintuitive result further,
we propose that a behavioral bias may be driving these results.
2.3.2 Potential Explanations
In this section, we consider whether risk aversion, loss aversion or differences
in the weighting of small versus large probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
can explain the results of our pilot study.
We first investigate risk aversion as an explanation of the choice pattern found
in our pilot study. A risk averse retailer dislikes an increase in uncertainty regard-
ing profits. Since we know that the low product risk product generates less profit
variance than the high product risk product, this results in less product risk under
both contracts. This would imply that retailers prefer the low product risk product
regardless of contract type. Our pilot study demonstrated that participants had a
stronger preference for the high product risk product under the wholesale price con-
tract than the buyback contract. If risk aversion were used to explain our results,
this would imply that when using the wholesale price contract, participants were
risk seeking while when using the buyback contract they were risk averse. Because
risk aversion is an individual level factor, decision maker risk aversion should not
differ based on the contract type offered. Therefore, risk aversion cannot be driving
our results.
We now consider the ability of two components of Prospect Theory to explain
our results: (1) loss aversion or (2) the probability weighting function. Prospect
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Table 2.1: Percentage of Participants Selecting High Risk Product in Pilot Study
Table Condition Graph Condition
Period WP BB P-value WP BB P-value
N=31 N=32 N=31 N=32
1 52% 28% .06 52% 28% 0.05
2 74% 28% < 0.001 58% 28% 0.02
3 61% 19% < 0.001 61% 19% < 0.001
4 58% 41% 0.17 58% 34% 0.05
5 74% 13% < 0.001 65% 31% 0.01
6 54% 38% 0.17 52% 47% 0.71
7 68% 44% 0.05 52% 41% 0.38
8 71% 28% < 0.001 58% 34% 0.05
9 71% 38% 0.01 61% 25% 0.01
10 58% 34% 0.06 61% 38% 0.05
11 64% 47% 0.16 65% 34% 0.02
12 52% 25% 0.03 61% 47% 0.25
13 61% 28% 0.01 58% 34% 0.05
14 61% 25% 0.06 55% 19% 0.01
15 55% 19% < 0.001 55% 16% 0.001
16 71% 56% 0.23 71% 50% 0.09
17 71% 28% < 0.001 71% 28% < 0.001
18 61% 16% < 0.001 55% 34% 0.10
19 68% 31% 0.003 68% 41% 0.03
20 68% 22% < 0.001 68% 22% < 0.001
21 74% 16% < 0.001 61% 22% 0.001
22 55% 28% 0.03 68% 31% 0.01
23 77% 38% 0.001 61% 50% 0.38
24 68% 34% 0.001 61% 38% 0.05
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Theory proposes that decision makers consider probability of loss, conditional losses,
probability of gain, and conditional gains separately. Rather than weighting each
of these components equally, leading to expected profit, the decision maker assigns
differential weights to these components, deriving a utility. Therefore, we will first
rewrite expected profits as the sum of these components for each contract.
We begin by establishing the point at which the retailer experiences nega-
tive versus positive profits under each contract type. When demand, either DS or
DR, is greater than the fixed quantity Q, the retailer earns positive profits equal
to (r − W )Q with both the wholesale price and buyback contract since r > W .
When demand is less than the fixed Q, the retailer’s profits under the wholesale
price contract can be generally expressed as rD−WQ and the retailer only incurs a
loss when rD < WQ. Therefore, when the retailer is operating under the wholesale
price contract, he incurs a loss whenever realized demand is less than WQ
r
. Define the
probability of loss as p(L)S = Prob(DS <
W (1−α)Q
r
) for the low product risk product
and p(L)R = Prob(DR <
WαQ
r
) for the high product risk product. The probability
of gain is then defined as p(G)S = Prob(DS >
W (1−α)Q
r
) for the low product risk
product and p(G)R = Prob(DR >
WαQ
r
) for the high product risk product.
Under the buyback contract, profits can be generally expressed as rD−WQ+
b(Q−D), implying that a loss is incurred whenever revenues of rD+ b(Q−D) are
less than costs of WQ. Therefore, when the retailer is operating under the buyback
contract, he incurs a loss whenever realized demand is less than (W−b)Q
r−b . Define the
probability of loss as p(L)S,b = Prob(DS <
(W−b)(1−α)Q
r−b ) for the low product risk
product and p(L)R,b = Prob(DR <
(W−b)(α)Q
r−b ) for the high product risk product.
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Similarly, the probability of gain is defined as p(G)S,b = Prob(DS >
(W−b)(1−α)Q
r−b )
for the low product risk product and p(G)R,b = Prob(DR >
(W−b)(α)Q
r−b ) for the high
product risk product.
Let C(L)S, C(G)S, C(L)R, and C(G)R denote conditional losses and gains
for both the low and high product risk product under the wholesale price contract
(a subscript of b will indicate buyback contract). With established expressions for
probability of loss/gain, we can break expected profits down into expected losses
and expected gains, and apply weights to the components to define utility. This will
allow us to consider the ability of loss aversion and Prospect Theory to explain our
results.
Consider a general weighting function applied to probability of loss, ωL(p),
and probability of gain, ωG(p). This provides a general expected utility under the
wholesale price contract is given by:
U(α) = ωL(p(L)S)C(L)S + ωG(p(G)S)C(G)S +
ωL(p(L)R)C(L)R + ωG(p(G)R)C(G)R)
Similarly, the expected utility under the buyback contract is given by:
Ub(α) = ωL(p(L)S,b)C(L)S,b + ωG(p(G)S,b)C(G)S,b +
ωL(p(L)R,b)C(L)R,b + ωG(p(G)R,b)C(G)R,b)
Next, we consider how loss aversion changes utility. A loss averse retailer
places a greater weight on losses than gains (i.e., ωL(p) = λ ∗ p where λ > 1 and
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ωG(p) = p). With a fixed order quantity, Q, expected losses are larger for the high
product risk product than the low product risk product regardless of the contract
type. As in Tversky and Kahneman (1991), we assume a constant λ for all decision
makers. Under this assumption, we again should observe a stronger preference for
the low product risk product under both types of contracts. Therefore, while both
loss aversion and risk aversion may alter the evaluation of an individual product
across contract types, the comparison of the two products under a given contract
type is not altered when Q is fixed. Loss aversion alone cannot explain the results
of the pilot study.
Finally, we consider a second tenet of Prospect Theory that proposes that
decision makers overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities.
Returning to the utility functions described above, Prospect Theory suggests that
decision makers apply a nonlinear probability weighting function, ωL(p) and ωG(p),
when evaluating utility (see Prelec 1998). In line with Cumulative Prospect Theory
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992), we assume that the probability of loss is weighted
with ωL(p) = ω(p) and the probability of gain is weighted with ωG(p) = 1−ω(p). For
consistency with prior research, we will assume throughout the paper a weighting
function ω(p) = exp(−(−ln(p)λ)) where 0 < λ < 1. This function is both regressive
(i.e., first ω(p) > p, then ω(p) < p) and s-shaped (i.e., is first concave, then convex)
and is therefore able to describe behavior consistent with Prospect Theory. Notably,
this function can explain a flip in preferences between the low and high product risk
product as p(L)S and p(L)R or p(L)S,b and p(G)R,b increase.
When the probability of loss is low for both the high and low product risk
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product (i.e., close to 0%), ω(p) leads to an overweighting of losses and a higher
utility with the low product risk product. When the probability of loss is high
for both the high and low product risk product (i.e., close to 100%), ω(p) leads to
an overweighting of gains and a higher utility with the high product risk product.
Because the buyback contract systematically decreases the chance of loss for both
products when Q is fixed, this may lead to a distinctly different comparison of the
two products under the buyback contract than under the wholesale price contract.
2.3.3 Prospect Theory Model
Given that Prospect Theory’s two components (loss aversion and differences
in weighting small versus large probabilities) can explain a flip in preferences for
the high versus low product risk product across contract types while risk aversion
and loss aversion alone cannot, we develop a new model of retailer decision making
based on Prospect Theory. We develop formal hypotheses based on this model to
be tested in Section 2.4.
Recall that Equation 2.1 described a retailer’s choice of α in terms of the
difference in expected profit between the high and low product risk product (i.e.
δEP ). Rather than use ∆EP to predict changes in α as in Equation 2.1, we will now
define utilities derived from each product assuming that probabilities are weighted
by ω(p) = exp(−(−ln(p)λ)) with 0 < λ < 1. This provides a difference in expected
utility of ∆U = U(1)−U(0) for the wholesale price contract and ∆Ub = U(1)−U(0)
80
for the buyback contract. Thus, in contrast to Equation 2.1, Equation 2.2 allows
for decision makers to weight probabilities consistent with Prospect Theory.
α = (1− βBB ∗ IBB)βU ∗∆U + βBB ∗ IBB(βU ∗∆Ub) (2.2)
The results of our pilot study suggest that βU is positive, leading to an α = 1
when the utility of the high product risk product is greater and an α = 0 when the
utility of the low product risk product is greater. Specifically, this utility function
predicts that for very small probabilities of loss, the participant will overweight loss,
selecting the low product risk product. In contrast, when the probability of loss is
large, participants will overweight gains, selecting the high product risk product.
Below, we develop testable hypotheses based on this model.
2.3.4 Hypotheses
As noted in above, our pilot test revealed that participants acting as retailers
did not align with rational, risk neutral behavior in selecting which product to stock
(i.e., behavior did not adhere to Equation 2.1). It is possible that two behavioral
influences are at play. First, we acknowledge that introducing a buyback may change
the framing of the decision causing the decision maker to evaluate choices differently
than under the wholesale price contract.
Hypothesis 2.1. The product mix selected under the buyback contract will be sig-
nificantly different from the product mix selected under the wholesale price contract
(i.e., the coefficient of Ibb in Equation 2.2 will be significant).
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Our second hypothesis is derived from results found in the pilot study. While
Equation 2.1 predicts profit maximizing behavior, we found in our pilot study that
this does not accurately explain participant preferences. However, the model of
retailer behavior presented in Equation 2.2 assumes that participants overweight
small probabilities and underweight large probabilities, potentially creating a flip in
preferences for the low product risk product across contract types. Therefore, as
in Equation 2.2, we propose that retailers will be impacted by the gains and losses
presented.
Hypothesis 2.2. Participants will overweight gains when the chance of gain is less
than the chance of loss and will overweight losses when the chance of gain is greater
than the chance of loss (i.e., Equation 2.2 will better predict product mix selections
than Equation 2.1).
Study 1 was designed to test these hypotheses in an environment where quan-
tity is fixed and the sole choice is allocating the fixed quantity between a high and
low product risk product.
2.4 Study 1: Retailer Product Choice
Study 1 was designed to explicitly test retailer preferences between high and
low product risk products when offered either the wholesale price or buyback con-
tract. Specifically, we test whether preferences shift as the probability of loss varies
so that we may examine the power of Prospect Theory to explain our findings in
the pilot study. Rather than restricting participants to a binary choice between the
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high or the low product risk product as in the pilot study, we offered participants
the opportunity to stock a mix of high and low product risk products to fulfill a
fixed order quantity, Q, by setting α as defined in Section 2.3.
The results of our pilot study suggests that participants may evaluate utility by
applying a probability weighting function. This theory claims that human decision
makers are more sensitive to differences in chance of loss or chance of gain when the
numbers are relatively close to zero because they overweight small probabilities (i.e.,
at the steepest points on the S-curve as seen in Figure 1 associated with region A:
small percentages). For example, in a comparison of p(L)R = 5% with p(L)S = 1%
versus a comparison of p(L)R = 25% with p(L)S = 21%, the 4% difference looms
larger in the first. Therefore, the difference in distance from a reference point of 0%
can create a flip in preferences.
H2.2 suggests that product mix selections depend on the relative probabilities
of gains and losses. Thus, in Study 1, we examine loss percentages, p(L), over a
spectrum where p(L) = [p(L)S, p(L)R, p(L)S,b, p(L)R,b]. In addition to manipulating
contract type, we manipulate loss percentage by breaking the spectrum into three
ranges: (1) small p(L): 0-20% (Region A in Figure 1), (2) medium p(L): 20-80%
(Region B in Figure 1) and (3) large p(L): 80-100% (Region C in Figure 1). Note
that while we refer to the range of p(L), a small p(L) implies large p(G) and large
p(L) implies small p(G). Essentially, we have a one-to-one mapping between p(L)
and p(G).
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of Prospect Theory Value Function
2.4.1 Procedures
Study 1 was conducted with 177 undergraduates from a large mid-Atlantic uni-
versity who were compensated based on performance via an incentive compatible
lottery. Our experimental design was 2 (contract type: wholesale price, buyback) x
3 (p(L): small, medium, large) where both contract type and p(L) were manipulated
between subjects. Manipulating contract type allowed us to examine a possible ef-
fect of offering a buyback contract rather than wholesale price, while manipulating
p(L) allowed us to study the role of Prospect Theory in retailer product selection.
Participants were told that they would operate a small kiosk that stocks a
fixed quantity of a single product category every period, Q. At the start of each
period, they were presented with two product options, one with low product risk
and one with high product risk. The decision task was to allocate the preset quan-
tity, Q, between the two options. This decision was made 6 times. Participants
were informed that profits from one of the 6 periods would be randomly selected to
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determine the performance-based portion of their payment. Therefore, our reward
structure encouraged participants to view each period independently. In each of the
6 periods, the participants were provided with four pieces of relevant information
prior to making their decision: (1) product category information, (2) contract pa-
rameters, (3) demand distributions of product options, and (4) comparable metrics
for product options. Below, we describe the information given to subjects by pre-
senting the parameters we used in Period 1. Please see the Appendix for a table
detailing the specific parameters used in Periods 1-6.
2.4.1.1 Product Category Information
At the start of each period, participants were told which product category they
would be stocking (e.g., handbags, belts, bracelets, gloves)1. The product category
was the same for all conditions by period with each product category seen only one
time by each participant. For example, in Period 1, all participants were told they
were selling scarves. After seeing the product category, participants were shown the
retail price ($25 for Period 1) for the product and were told that they will order a
fixed quantity, Q (with Q = 225 in Period 1).
Although each product has a different optimal order quantity under each con-
tract, we have fixed the order quantity across conditions since we are not interested
in the quantity decision but rather, how participants choose to stock high and low
1The product type was varied as a robustness check of our results. This ensured that partici-
pants’ preconceived notions of a particular product was not driving choices.
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product risk products. Studying this single decision allows us to isolate any effects
that may be altered if participants made the joint product/quantity decision. While
this quantity is not optimal, it does not detract from our findings regarding what
level of product risk retailers choose to take. We vary this Q to be either less than
the mode, equal to the mode, or greater than the mode of the triangular distribution
in a given decision period. The appendix details the demand distribution and fixed
Q for each decision period. Regardless of whether or not Q is optimal, one product
is characterized by lower product risk, therefore, we can study the retailer‘s level of
product risk for any fixed Q.
Finally, participants were informed that the resale value of leftover items was
equal to the cost to process leftover items, essentially creating a salvage value of $0.
2.4.1.2 Contract Parameters
Following basic product information, participants were shown a diagram ex-
plaining how either the wholesale price or buyback contract operated (See Appendix
for screenshots). Following this, participants saw the specific terms of the given con-
tract for the current period. In the wholesale price condition, participants were told
explicitly that the supplier was offering them a basic wholesale price in which he
would charge $w per item, regardless of the product option selected. In the buyback
condition, participants were told that the supplier would charge $wb (with wb = w
within each Period) per item and, if any items were leftover at the end of the selling
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season, the supplier would buy them back for $b per unit.2 Contract parameters, w
and b, were used to manipulate p(L) and were therefore the only parameters that
change by p(L) condition. In Period 1, we have w = wb = $12.50 with b = $4 in the
small p(L) condition, w = wb = $17.25 with b = $4 in the medium p(L) condition,
and w = wb = $22 with b = $4 in the large p(L) condition.
These contract parameters were designed specifically to create a difference
in expected profits of less than 3% (i.e., |Π(1)−Π(0)
Π(0)
| < 0.03). This restriction was
imposed so that, in terms of expected profits, participants should be relatively in-
different when selecting α if they are profit-maximizing. In contrast, if their behavior
is governed by a probability weighting function consistent with Prospect Theory (as
defined in Equation 2.2), then the low product risk product will generate higher
utility when p(L) is small (i.e., region A of Figure 2.3) and the high product risk
product will generate higher utility when p(L) is large (i.e., region C of Figure 2.3).
2.4.1.3 Demand Distribution of Product Options
The next piece of information given to the participants showed the demand
distribution of the product options. Both product options were assigned a random
letter as a label. For instance, in Period 1, the high product risk product was labeled
“Style A” and the low product risk product “Style B.” It was explained to partici-
pants that while both products follow a triangular distribution with the same “most
likely demand” (i.e., mode), one product option (the high product risk product)
2The same w was provided in each condition so that we could isolate the effect of the presence
of a buyback.
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had a lower minimum demand and higher maximum demand. In Period 1, both
products had a mode equal to 220 for all conditions. The high product risk product
had a maximum of 320 with a minimum of 50 while the low product risk product
had a maximum of 260 with a minimum of 80. This information was also displayed
visually as a graph of the demand distributions (see Figure 2).
The triangular distribution was chosen because it is easily understood by par-
ticipants and allowed us to generate the ranges for probability of loss/gain neces-
sary for verifying Prospect Theory. With this in mind, we study both left and right
skewed triangular distributions as well as fixed order quantities that are above and
below the mode. By considering all combinations of these pairings we provide a
robustness check for our results.
Figure 2.4: Illustration of Demand Distribution
2.4.1.4 Comparable Metrics for Product Options
Finally, participants were given information by which to compare the two prod-
uct options and their profit streams. Although expected profits were not explicitly
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shown, participants were shown probability of loss, p(L), conditional losses, C(L),
probability of gain, p(G), and conditional gains, C(G). This information was pro-
vided for five different mix options that participants could select: (1) stocking 100%
of the low product risk product, (2) stocking 75% of the low product risk product
and 25% of the high product risk product, (3) stocking 50% of each product option,
(4) stocking 25% of the low product risk product and 75% of the high product risk
product, (5) stocking 100% of the high product risk product.
These were the only mixing options presented to the participants. This in-
formation was displayed to the participants in table form. In Figures 3 and 4, we
present the tables provided to participants in Period 1 in the small p(L) condition
for both the wholesale price and buyback contract. From these figures, we see that
as a participant stocks more of the high product risk product (product B in the
figures), the variance in his profit stream increases as a result of added product risk.
Figure 2.5: Comparable Metrics provided in Wholesale Price Condition for Small
p(L)
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Figure 2.6: Comparable Metrics provided in Buyback Condition for Small p(L)
2.4.1.5 Dependent Measures
After being presented with the information above, participants were asked to
select which mix of products they would like to stock. Demand was then randomly
generated from the appropriate distribution and profits/losses were shown to par-
ticipants at the end of each period.
After all 6 periods had concluded, participants were presented with the same
loss/gain information framed as a lottery rather than inventory decision. This de-
pendent measure was used to explore the effects of framing on behavior. Following
this, participants completed four scales measuring individual differences in (1) nu-
meracy (Fagerlin et al. 2007), (2) anticipated regret (Kugler et al. 2009), (3) loss
aversion (Zhang et al. 2012), and (4) risk aversion (Weber et al. 2002). While risk
aversion and loss aversion were conceptually ruled out as drivers of the results in
our pilot study, we collect information regarding these individual differences to act
as controls in our analysis. In addition, we collect information to gauge the ability
of anticipated regret and numeracy to explain our results.
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2.4.2 Results
Table 2.2 presents the results of Study 1 as percentage of high product risk
product selected by condition, by period. Stocking 0% indicates a participant se-
lected 100% of the low product risk product (i.e., α = 0) while stocking 100%
indicates that the participant selected 100% of the high product risk product (i.e.,
α = 1). A star indicates that the percentage is significantly different from a 50/50
mix of products in a two-tailed test with p < 0.05. We will first discuss preliminary
results evident in Table 2.2. Following this, we will examine the results of a series
of regression models to confirm our hypotheses.
As we observe in Table 2.2, the wholesale price contract appears to induce a
50/50 split the majority of the time with only 5 cases having an average signifi-
cantly different from 50/50. The buyback contract, however, leads to product mixes
significantly different from 50/50 split in all but the medium p(L) condition. These
preliminary observations support H2.1, indicating significant differences in behavior
when offered the buyback contract.
Another notable observation is that participants appear to stock more of the
low product risk product in the small p(L) condition but less of the low product risk
product in the large p(L) condition. This supports H2.2’s prediction that partici-
pant preferences are sensitive to losses when p(L) is small and gains when p(L) is
large (i.e., p(G) is small). Given that the buyback contract produces smaller p(L)
than the wholesaleprice contract for a given w = wb, participants are more sensi-
tive to the difference in loss percentage between products when p(L) is small and a
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Table 2.2: Percentage of High Product Risk Product Chosen by Condition and
Period
Condition Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 N
Small p(L) 53% 50% 45%* 46% 46% 43%* 28
(1.8) (2.1) (1.6) (2.0) (1.7) (2.1)
WP Medium p(L) 43%* 42%* 44% 48% 51% 48% 30
(2.3) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.6) (1.9)
Large p(L) 48% 52% 51% 52% 57%* 51% 29
(1.7) (1.6) (1.9) (1.8) (2.1) (2.2)
Small p(L) 35%* 32%* 32%* 32%* 33%* 34%* 31
(2.1) (1.9) (1.9) (1.8) (1.9) (1.6)
BB Medium p(L) 54% 50% 56% 51% 54% 51% 29
(2.8) (2.4) (2.5) (2.5) (2.8) (2.7)
Large p(L) 64%* 60%* 65%* 66%* 67%* 65%* 30
(2.1) (2.2) (2.0) (1.9) (1.8) (2.5)
Percentages represent average stocking mixes by condition with the standard
deviation reported in parentheses. A * indicates significantly different from
a 50/50 mix in a two-tailed test with p ≤ 0.05
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buyback contract is offered.
To provide additional support for this we conducted a two-way repeated mea-
sures ANOVA with period as the repeated factor. The results show that p(L) sig-
nificantly impacts choice (F (2) = 109, p < 0.001). While the main effect of contract
type is not significant (F (1) = 3.833, p < 0.11), the interaction between contract
type and p(L) is significant (F (2) = 86, p < 0.001). This indicates that contract
type does not directly influence participant stocking decisions over the 6 periods;
the impact of p(L) differs across contract type.
To test our hypotheses directly, we conducted two regressions based on Equa-
tions 2.1 and 2.2. The first model, based on Equation 2.1, predicts that expected
profits drive the participants’ choice of α such that α = (1 − βBB ∗ IBB)βEP ∗
∆EP + βBB ∗ IBB(βEP ∗ ∆EPb). Conversely, Equation 2.2 predicts that partic-
ipants apply a probability weighting function consistent with Prospect Theory,
ω(p) = exp(−(−ln(p))λ) with 0 < λ < 1 3. This dictates that α = (1 − βBB ∗
IBB)βU ∗∆U + βBB ∗ IBB(βU ∗∆Ub).
Let us first examine Equation 2.1 which predicts profit maximizing behavior
(see Table 2.3). Our study was designed such that participants should be indifferent
between the two products in terms of expected profits (i.e., selecting a 50/50 split
in all conditions). In our regression model, ∆EP is not a significant predictor of
the retailer’s level of product risk, α. While we designed the experiment so that
expected profit would not be a significant predictor, Table 2.2 clearly indicates a
3Although three values of λ were tested (λ=0.1,0.5, and 0.9), only the results of the model with
λ=0.1 are reported. Results are similar across different values of λ.
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Table 2.3: Results of Logistic Regression on Product Choice (Equation 2.1)
Small p(L) Medium p(L) Large p(L) All Conditions
Intercept 0.634*** 0.492*** 0.591*** 0.578***
(0.047) (0.067) (0.051) (0.036)
IBB -0.185*** 0.109 0.231*** 0.05
(0.037) (0.062) (0.041) (0.03)
∆EP -0.014 0.022 0.029 0.004
0.025 0.031 (0.024) (0.018)
IBB ∗∆EP 0.013 -0.001 -0.077* -0.027
(0.033) (0.044) (0.035) (0.025)
Loss Aversion -0.005 0.058 -0.028 -0.002
(0.016) (0.042) (0.017) (0.012)
Risk Aversion 0.005 0.016 -0.002 0.008
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
Anticipated Regret -0.003 -0.018 0.0004 -0.012
(0.005) (0.068) (0.005) (0.008)
Numeracy -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
Period -0.01 0.007 0.007 0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
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Table 2.4: Results of Logistic Regression on Product Choice (Equation 2.2)
Small p(L) Medium p(L) Large p(L) All Conditions
Intercept 0.775*** 0.492*** 0.614*** 0.597***
(0.079) (0.065) (0.048) (0.034)
IBB -0.345*** -0.0002 0.191*** -0.021**
(0.089) (0.0002) (0.034) (0.0059)
∆U 0.004* 0.091* 0.0003** 0.017*
(0.002) (0.036) (0.003) (0.004)
IBB ∗∆U 0.003* 0.0002 -0.0006 0.000003
(0.002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Loss Aversion -0.003 0.059 -0.031 -0.00009
(0.016) (0.042) (0.017) (0.0124)
Risk Aversion 0.005 0.016 -0.002 0.007
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.048)
Anticipated Regret -0.003 -0.018 0.0005 -0.011
(0.005) (0.068) (0.005) (0.036)
Numeracy -0.003 0.003 0.0006 0.003
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
Period 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.0008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
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pattern in participants decisions where a 50/50 split is not consistently selected.
This pattern suggests differences in product choice behavior under the buyback
contract, however, this pattern is only detectable in our regression when the results
are separeted by condition. When p(L) is small, we see that the coefficient of IBB
is negative and significant indicating a stronger preference for the low product risk
product under the buyback contract as in the pilot study. When p(L) is large, we
see that the coefficient of IBB is positive and significant indicating a reversal of
preferences.
Equation 2.2, which predicts that participants will evaluate expected loss and
expected gains through the lens of a probability weighting function appears to better
predict our data. The coefficient of IBB in the full model is negative and significant,
−0.021, demonstrating that participants select more of the low product risk product
when offered the buyback contract as compared to the wholesale price contract (see
Table 2.4). When broken down by p(L) condition, we find a pattern consistent with
that of the results using Equation 2.1. This finding confirms H2.1 which posits that
the buyback contract will evoke different behavior.
Now we will turn our attention to understanding the role that expected losses
and gains play. The coefficient of ∆U is both positive and significant in all regression
models indicating that participants stock more of the high product risk product when
it generates higher utility (i.e., α increases) and stock more of the low product risk
product when it generates higher utility (i.e., α decreases). This finding provides
evidence that participants evaluate the chance of loss and chance of gain using a
prospect theory probability weighting function, supporting H2.2. In addition, we
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find that there is no significant effect of period or the individual level factors (i.e.,
loss aversion, risk aversion, anticipated regret, and numeracy).
To test which model better fits our data, we built the same full regression
models (column 4 in both Table 2.3 and 2.4) using a randomly selected 75% of the
data. These models were then applied to a hold out set consisting of the remaining
25% of the data. For both Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.2, we computed the mean
squared error (MSE) between the predicted product mix and the actual product
mix on this hold out set. The model built using Equation 2.1 resulted in an MSE of
0.38 while the model using Equation 2.2 resulted in an MSE of 0.051. These results
suggest that a model consistent with a Prospect Theory weighting function better
explains the results of our study.
2.4.3 Discussion
Study 1 manipulated contract type and p(L) between subjects, allowing us
to test H2.1 and H2.2. Participants acting as retailers assumed markedly different
levels of product risk when offered a buyback contract, as opposed to a wholesale
price contract, opting to stock more of the low product risk product under the buy-
back contract. This finding suggests that although the buyback contract introduces
supplier risk-sharing, seems to encourage retailers to assume less product risk un-
der some conditions. In addition, we find that product choice is influenced by the
relative size of p(G) and p(L). While we do find behavior consistent with Prospect
Theory, the more interesting result is that the buyback contract may lead to stock-
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ing more of the low product risk product when p(L) is low but this effect is reversed
when when p(L) is high.
Consistent with our pilot study, we find a pattern of results that is consis-
tent with Prospect Theory that cannot be explained by either loss aversion or risk
aversion. In this study, we attempt to eliminate two additional explanations of
behavior, anticipated regret and complexity. First, we consider task complexity.
The wholesale price contract creates an arguably less complex decision setting than
the buyback contract does, potentially influencing choice behavior across contract
types. However, product preferences also change as the probability of loss grows
larger. Because of this, we can rule out task complexity as an explanation of behav-
ior. Finally, we address anticipated regret as a possible explanation for behavior. If
a decision maker anticipates regretting his decision to stock the high product risk
product should realized demand be low, a buyback would potentially decrease this
anticipated regret, suggesting that retailer’s would stock more of the high product
risk product when offered the buyback contract. Like task complexity, however,
anticipated regret cannot explain changes in preferences due to changes in proba-
bilities of loss. Therefore, we rule out anticipated regret as an explanation.
This study achieved two primary goals. First, we have demonstrated that
contract type affects the level of product risk taken by the retailer. Second, we have
found that results are not aligned with risk neutral behavior but rather are in line
with a Prospect Theory explanation. However, Study 1 considered product choice
as an isolated decision. In reality, retailers make a full retail assortment planning
decision, deciding which products to stock and how much of them to stock. Given
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the copius amounts of research regarding the quantity decision for a fixed product,
it is interesting to study if the observed behavior changes when making both de-
cisions at the same time. Although research suggests that human decision makers
consider decisions in an isolated, sequential manner (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993),
it is possible that participants will balance quantity risk with product risk when the
quantity decision is considered simultaneously with product choice. Therefore, in
the following section we present Study 2 where we allow participants to first select a
product to stock and then determine how much of that product to order. The next
section proposes new hypotheses and presents the procedures and results of Study
2.
2.5 Study 2: The Joint Product/Quantity Decision
Study 1 confirmed our predictions that decision makers’ product choices are
subject to behavioral influences. Since in practice, the decision of what product to
stock is considered in conjunction with quantity, it is important to study how one
decision maker approaches both decisions. Therefore, we have designed Study 2 to
study how the retailer’s behavior changes when making the joint decision of what to
stock and how much to stock under both the wholesale price and buyback contract.
Below, we extend our hypotheses to consider the joint decision and then explain the
procedures of Study 2.
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2.5.1 Hypotheses
Our previous studies suggest that the wholesale price contract encourages re-
tailers to assume more product risk, but these studies have not incorporated quantity
decisions. A rational decision maker may use quantity to balance product risk. For
example, a retailer using a wholesale price contract may choose to stock a product
with higher demand variance but order a lower quantity of that product, balancing
higher product risk with lower quantity risk.
Although taking a broad perspective of decision problems is generally recog-
nized as a requirement for rational decision making, empirical research suggests that
actual decision makers tend to make decisions one at a time, neglecting the connec-
tion between current and future decisions (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993). There is
copious evidence that decision makers approach multiple decisions sequentially but
in an isolated manner, compounding the effects of behavioral biases. In their paper
on choice bracketing, Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999) propose that when de-
cision makers approach a set of connected decisions, they can consider them one at
a time (a very narrow bracket) or many simultaneously (a broad bracket). Simon-
son (1990) refers to this tendency to segregate or aggregate decisions as sequential
versus simultaneous choice. Notably, decision makers are more likely to use narrow
bracketing when they face mentally taxing decisions(Read, Loewenstein and Rabin
1999). Consistent with this earlier work, we expect that participants will approach
product and quantity decisions in an isolated manner, implying that product choice
behavior will be consistent with Study 1 and quantity decisions should be consistent
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with prior research (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000).
Hypothesis 2.3. Quantity decisions will not be significantly influenced by the par-
ticipant’s product choice selection.
2.5.2 Procedures
The goal of Study 2 is to provide a robustness check for the effect of contract
type on retailer product choice in the presence of quantity decisions. Given that
Study 1 examined the full range of p(L), in Study 2 we truncate the range of p(L)
and focus solely on the effect of contract type, using only small p(L). Our exper-
imental design is 2-cell (contract type: wholesale price, buyback), where contract
type is manipulated between subjects. The study was conducted with 50 under-
graduate students from a large Mid-Atlantic university who were currently enrolled
in an Operations Management course. They were provided course extra credit for
participation and were also compensated via an incentive compatible lottery.
The procedures of Study 2 were similar to Study 1 with a few minor changes.
First, participants were told that they operated 6 independent stores and were going
make 6 joint decisions of a product to stock and quantity to stock. It was made clear
that the profits of the 6 stores were not linked in any way. As in Study 1, in each of
the 6 decisions, the participants were given 2 product options. Again, participants
saw product category information, contract parameters, demand distributions, and
comparable metrics. The only differences were that the demand distribution pro-
vided for both products was the normal distribution (rather than triangular) and
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comparable metrics were provided, in a similar format found in Figures 3 and 4,
for each product for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. Finally, parameters were
set such that the optimal order quantity was the 40th percentile in decision 1-3 and
the 60th percentile in decisions 4-6 4. The Appendix provides tables detailing the
parameter selections for each of the 6 decisions in Study 2.
After being exposed to all relevant information, participants were asked to
make a binary choice between products. Study 1 allowed a mix of products, but,
since we have now incorporated quantity as a variable, a binary choice simplifies
the decision setting for the participants while still being able to test our hypotheses.
Following this, the participant entered a quantity to order. It was made clear to
participants that they could enter any quantity they desired and it did not have
to be the 25th, 50th, or 75th percentiles shown as examples (See Figure 5). While
participants made the two choices in a sequential manner, all information was pre-
sented prior to either of the decisions and therefore the decisions could have been
considered jointly by participants. After they made choices for each of the 6 inde-
pendent stores, the participants answered a series of scale questions to gauge their
individual risk aversion, loss aversion, and numeracy.
2.5.3 Results
Tables 2.5 and 2.8 below present a summary of the results from Study 2.
Table 2.5 outlines the percentage of participants who selected the high product risk
4Given research demonstrating a pull to center effect in order quantities, we consider optimal
quantities on both sides of the mean.
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Figure 2.7: Screen Shot of Tables Provided in Study 2
product in each condition for each of the 6 decisions. Table 2.8 summarizes the
quantity decisions each participant made and includes the optimal order quantity
(Opt. Q) and mean demand (Mean) were for each of the decisions for comparison.
We will first address the product choice decisions of the participants and then the
quantity decisions.
Table 2.5: Summary of Study 2 Product Choice Decisions
Contract Type Decision 1* Decision 2* Decision 3* Decision 4* Decision 5* Decision 6* N
WP 76% 68% 64% 72% 84% 76% 25
BB 28% 12% 16% 28% 44% 24% 25
A * indicates that percentages are significantly different across contract types
for that Decision period in a two-tailed test with p < 0.05.
To begin analyzing the product choice decisions of Study 2, we first examine
preliminary conclusions drawn from Table 2.5 and then present the analysis of a
logistic regression model (see Table 2.6). As we observe from Table 2.5, there is a
strong preference for the high product risk product when participants are offered the
wholesale price contract and a strong preference for the low product risk product
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when offered the buyback contract. This evidence demonstrates that results were
qualitatively similar to those in Study 1. To verify this conclusion more rigorously,
we conducted two logistic regression models, similar to Equation 2.1 and Equation
2.2, in which the baseline is the probability that a participant chose to stock the
high product risk product.
Similar to Study 1, a regression testing Equation 2.1 suggests that expected
profit is not a significant factor in predicting participant product choice. Again, we
see that a model testing Equation 2.2 better explains our results. We see that the
coefficient of IBB, −0.28, is both negative and significant. This indicates that when
offered the buyback contract at a low p(L), the likelihood that a participant selected
the low product risk product increases. Also in line with Study 1, we see that as
∆U increases, participants are more likely to select the high product risk product
(i.e., selecting the product that offers greater utility). This effect is enhanced un-
der the buyback contract (as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of
IBB ∗∆U).
To examine the fit of both equations with our data, we again conducted anal-
ysis using a hold out set. Both Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.2 were built on a
randomly selected 75% of the data. These models were then tested on the remain-
ing 25% of the data used as a hold out set. Using a cut off point of 0.5 (i.e., model
prediction resulting in < 0.5 indicates selecting the low product risk product and
> 0.5 indicates selecting the high product risk product) we compare the models‘
predictions of product choice with actual product choice (see Table 2.7). The re-
sults of this test show that the model using Equation 2.1 accurately predicts product
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choice in 58% of the cases whereas the model using Equation 2.2 accurately predicts
product choice in 70% of the cases. This provides robust support for our findings
in Study 1 and confirms that behavior did not change when participants also made
the quantity decision.
We will now turn our attention to an examination of the quantity decision.
In Table 2.6, it is obvious that participants are not selecting the optimal quantity;
however, a pattern is detectable. In the first 3 decisions, participants are consistently
ordering more than is optimal (when optimal is 40th percentile) and order less than
optimal in decisions 4-6 (when optimal is 60th percentile). This suggests that a pull
to center bias is occurring, similar to what previous research has found in retailer
order quantity decisions (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000).
Figure 2.8: Average Quantity Decisions as a Fraction of Optimal
The main focus of Study 2, however, is to determine if product choice impacts
the subsequent quantity decision (i.e., if participants consider the decisions in iso-
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Table 2.6: Results of Logistic Regression Model: Chance of selecting high product
risk product
Equation 2.1 Equation 2.2













Loss Aversion 0.117 0.159
(0.256) (0.255)
Risk Aversion 0.158 0.155
(0.16) (0.159)




Table 2.7: Measure of Model Fit: Product Choice
Expected Profit Expected Utility
Equation 1 Equation 2
Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted
Low Product Risk High Product Risk Low Product Risk High Product Risk
Selected 21% 13% 30% 9%
Low Product Risk
Selected 28% 37% 21% 40%
High Product Risk
lation or simultaneously). To do this, we conducted a regression model to estimate
retailer order quantity. Rather than estimate order quantity exactly since order
quantities should vary through decisions 1-6, we have normalized all order quan-
tities to be a fraction of optimal. In this regression, we include similar variables
as in the product choice model with the addition of three new variables. Given
the evidence of a pull to center bias, we have included an indicator variable for if
the optimal quantity is below the mean (Opt.BelowMean) as well as an interac-
tion between IBB and Opt.BelowMean. Finally, in order to determine the impact
of product choice on quantity decisions, we include a variable indicating the high
product risk product has been select (IR). The results of this model are presented
in Table 2.9.
We will first note that the coefficient of IR is not significant. This indicates
that the product choice made by participants has not significantly impacted their
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Table 2.8: Summary of Study 2 Quantity Decisions
Condition D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
WP Chose Avg. Order Q 205.55 256.59 290.95 193.83 255.35 303.73
Low Product Risk Opt. Q 174 208 247 213 270 328
Mean 200 250 300 200 250 300
Chose Avg. Order Q 212.28 276.66 322.5 209.28 301.72 310
High Product Risk Opt. Q 163 198 230 218 275 344
Mean 200 250 300 200 250 300
BB Chose Avg. Order Q 222.4 271.8 301.64 192.1 272.4 320.1
Low Product Risk Opt. Q 187 230 272 226 291 357
Mean 200 250 300 200 250 300
Chose Avg. Order Q 255.6 284.2 358.9 212.4 291.4 367.99
High Product Risk Opt. Q 182 224 265 236 302 370
Mean 200 250 300 200 250 300
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quantity choice. This result, in conjunction with the fact the product choice be-
havior is qualitatively similar in Study 1 and Study 2, confirm that participants
consider the decisions sequentially rather than simultaneously. Finally, we
take note of the impact of the pull to center bias. Recall that the baseline model
estimates quantity under the wholesale price contract when the optimal quantity is
below the mean. Opt.BelowMean has a positive and significant coefficient, 0.374,
suggesting that when the optimal quantity is below the mean, participants order
quantities increase as a percentage of optimal. More interesting, are the coefficients
of IBB and IBB ∗ Opt.BelowMean. The coefficient of IBB, 0.223, is both positive
and significant, indicating that when optimal is above the mean, order quantities
are higher (i.e., closer to optimal) under the buyback contract. The coefficient of
IBB ∗ Opt.BelowMean, 0.092, is negative and significant indicating the reverse.
When the optimal order quantity is below the mean, participants order significantly
less under the buyback contract (i.e., closer to optimal). These results suggest that,
while there still exists a pull to center effect under both contracts, the effect is
dampened by the buyback contract.
2.5.4 Discussion
Study 2 was designed to both reaffirm the results of Study 1 and explore how
incorporating quantity choice affects behavior. By manipulating contract type, we
were able to replicate the behavior found in Study 1. This finding, coupled with
the pull to center bias observed in the quantity decision, demonstrates that when
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making the decisions jointly, participant behavior is not different than when making
the decisions in an isolated manner.
Together, Study 1 and Study 2 show that contract type affects inventory de-
cisions in multiple ways. Study 1 showed that the buyback contract can lead to
choices of more conservative products with less demand risk. Study 2 replicates this
effect and also provides evidence that buyback contracts moderate the pull to center
bias in quantity decisions.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how contract type influences the product risk assumed
by a retailer. We propose that decision makers acting as retailers consider a com-
bination of losses and gains rather than expected profit when evaluating the choice
between two products. Given that a buyback contract alters the framing of this de-
cision, we examine how the level of product risk the retailer assumes changes when
the retailer is offered a wholesale price versus a buyback contract. The results of
our pilot study provide strong evidence that instead of acting in a profit maximizing
manner, decision makers assume more product risk when offered a wholesale price
contract than when offered a buyback contract. We attempt to explain these results
by building a predictive model based on Prospect Theory and testing this model
experimentally.
We find that a model consistent with Prospect Theory better explains retailer
choice behavior than a model consistent with expected profit maximization. A
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wholesale price contract reduces the relative difference in losses when comparing
products with high and low demand variance. When choosing a product to stock,
the retailer compares the expected losses and gains for a product with high demand
variance and a product with low demand variance. Because the wholesale price
contract makes the losses appear to be more similar across options, participants
may focus more on the chance of gains than on the chance of losses than they
do when using the buyback contract. In Study 1, we examine the mix of high
and low product risk products participants acting as retailers choose to stock using
each contract, provided the quantity decision has been predetermined. Across a
wide range of loss percentages, we find that a model of retailer behavior including
the Prospect Theory probability weighting function best explains product choice
preferences. Moreover, in Study 2, we demonstrate consistent product choices when
retailers make joint product choice and quantity decisions.
We contribute to current literature on product assortment planning by ex-
panding the scope of the decision problem. While the product assortment literature
focuses on optimal retail assortments in response to consumer demand functions,
the contract between the retailer and supplier is assumed to be exogenous. There-
fore, we provide insight by demonstrating that because decision makers are subject
to behavioral biases, the contract type can influence the set of products a retailer
wishes to stock and the overall level of product risk they assume. Furthermore, we
connect product assortment planning decisions with behavioral decision theory by
demonstrating that decision makers exhibit similar biases in an inventory context.
Our results provide many opportunities for extensions. One extension is to
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consider alternate forms of contracts. We have studied only how a buyback contract
affects the level of product risk taken by the retailer. There are numerous contracts
at the disposal of suppliers and retailers. Any number of these contracts could sim-
ilarly alter the decision framing creating systematic differences in product choices.
A second direction for future work is to explore when other decision bias im-
pact the retail assortment planning decisions. We have found evidence that when
faced with a buyback contract, loss percentages are altered in such a way that the
influence of Prospect Theory governs participant decisions. There are various be-
havioral biases that have been found to impact choices under uncertainty such as
loss aversion and risk aversion. An interesting extension would be to consider when
alternate biases are present or conditions under which we can mediate the effect of
Prospect Theory.
In summary, we provide strong evidence for a connection between contract
type and retailer product risk. This connection provides important insight for both
suppliers and retailers. Suppliers who offer multiple products to retailers should be
aware that the structure of their contract may be influencing the retailers choice
among the offered products. It is possible that suppliers could use contract type
as a way to induce retailers to purchase specific products. If contract type does
substantially affect retailer product choice as our results suggest, contracts may be
shaping product lines offered by retailers in the long run, affecting suppliers, retail-
ers and the end consumer. Therefore, understanding how contracts interact with
product choice decisions provides useful theoretical and practical insight.
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Chapter A: Retailer/Supplier Interview
Interviews conducted with retailers and suppliers were done both by phone and
online survey. Below, we present the set of questions asked during the interviews.
While these are the basic questions asked during every interview, interviewees were




(2) Current Company Name
(3) Current Number of Employees at Company
(4) Current Company’s Annual Revenue/Sales
(5) What types of items do you buy/sell for your company?
Stock items (items that infrequently change such as basic white undershirts
Fashion/Seasonal items









(1) Do you deal with most companies on a repeat basis?
(2) Do you generally speak with the same representative from each company?
(3) How does a company’s past performance influence your future interactions with
them?
Contract Specific Questions
(1) Typically, before the start of the season, you must set/accept the terms of a
purchase agreement for the items that you intend to sell/buy. Please think about
one or two of the buyers/suppliers with whom you deal and use the box below to
describe, in detail, the specifics of these interactions. Include details such as how
far in advance of the season the purchasing terms are agreed upon, who proposes
the purchasing terms, what is the payment structure, etc. Following this, we will
ask a series of follow-up questions.
(2) The following questions will help us understand the specifics of your purchase
agreements.
Is there typically only a wholesale price charged per item?
Who proposes the price, you or the other party?
Is the initial quantity ordered final, or are additional items allowed to be or-
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dered during the course of the season?
Is the retail price for the item already set? If so, who sets this, you or the
other party?
Is there ever a lower wholesale price offered for a larger order quantity (quan-
tity discount)?
If so, how many different prices are usually offered?
If so, under what circumstances is this lower wholesale price offered? (for par-
ticular items, for particular clients, if the order is large enough, etc.)
How frequently do you buy/sell items for your company? (once a month, 3
times per year, etc.)
Questions Regarding Activity During the Selling Season
Please indicate whether you are a buyer or a seller.
Retailer Questions1
(1) Can you describe what, if anything, you do during the season in order to promote
your inventory to consumers (require employees to approach customers, design store
layouts, run promotions, etc.)
(2) Do you have promotional sales/deals during the season?
(3) Can you ever place a second order with the seller if a particular item is experi-
encing higher than normal demand?
(4) How frequently do you update your website (weekly, every season, etc.)?
(5) How frequently do you email your customers (daily, weekly, during promotions,
1These questions were asked only when the interview was conducted with a buyer/retailer
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etc.)?
(6) Are you ever offered promotional money from the seller?
(7) If so, is this amount negotiated as part of the purchase agreement?
(8) Does the seller ever request sales data for the inventory from you during the
selling season?
(9) If so, do they use this information so as to suggest ways to increase the sales of
their inventory (lower price, re-position in store, etc.)?
Supplier Questions2
(1) Can you describe what, if anything, you do during the season to track the sale
of your items through the retailer (are you in communication with the retailer, do
they send you frequent sales reports, etc.)
(2) How influential do you think the retailer’s business practices are to the success
of your items?
(3) Are you able to influence the manner in which the retailer sells your items (price,
placement in store, promotions, etc.)?
(4) Can the retailer ever place a second order during the season if an item is expe-
riencing higher than normal demand?
(5) How frequently do you update your website (weekly, every season, etc.)?
(6) How frequently do you email your customers (daily, weekly, during promotions,
etc.)?
(7) Do you ever offer the retailer promotional money (money used to advertise your
2These questions were asked only when the interview was conducted with a seller/supplier
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items and/or cover the cost of promotional prices)?
(8) If so, is this amount negotiated as part of the purchase agreement?
(9) Do you ever request sales data from retailers for your items during the selling
season?
Questions Regarding Activity at the End of the Selling Season
Retailer Questions
(1) Could you describe, in detail, what happens to items at the end of the selling
season (put on sale incrementally, sent to other stores, returned, etc.)?
(2) How many markdowns do you typically use?
(3) Is the size of the markdown influenced by the number of items you have left?
(4) Does the seller ever offer you markdown money (meaning that they offer to sub-
sidize your profit margin loss for selling items on sale)?
(5) Is there ever a minimum price/floor price below which you are not allowed to
price merchandise?
(6) Is there a larger parent company or outlet store to which you can send unsold
merchandise?
(7) Do you ever sell unsold merchandise to liquidators?
(8) Do you ever donate unsold merchandise to charities?
(9) Can you ever send unsold merchandise back to the seller at the end of the season
and be reimbursed a fraction of the wholesale price?
(10) If so, is there limit on the quantity you can send back?
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Supplier Questions
(1) Could you describe, in detail, any information you know regarding what happens
to items at the end of the regular selling season (does the retailer put them on sale,
does the retailer send them back to you, etc.)?
(2) Do you know how many markdowns are typically used by retailers at the end of
the selling season?
(3) Is the size of the markdown influenced by the number of items left?
(4) Do you ever offer the retailer markdown money (meaning that you offer to
subsidize profit margin loss for selling items on sale)?
(5) Is there ever a minimum price/floor price below which you do not allow the
retailer to sell your merchandise?
(6) Is there a larger parent company or outlet store to which you can send unsold
merchandise?
(7) Do you ever sell unsold merchandise to liquidators?
(8) Do you ever donate unsold merchandise to charities?
(9) Do you ever allow retailers to send unsold merchandise back at the end of the
season and be credited a fraction of the wholesale price?
(10) If so, is there a limit on the quantity they can send back?
(11) If so, are there conditions under which you allow items to be sent back?
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Chapter B: Chapter 1 Study Procedures
Below we provide the stimuli provided to participants in Study 1, 2, and 3.
First we present screen shots of the diagrams shown to participants in order to de-
scribe the contracts (both wholesale price and buyback contract). These diagrams
were used throughout all three studies. Following that, we provide the text based
stimuli used in each of the three studies. Finally, we provide the scale questions





Before retailers sell goods to consumers, they need to buy these goods from a sup-
plier. The retailer and supplier often enter into a contract in which they specify
terms such as the price of the goods, how many goods will be purchased, and what
happens if the retailer is unable to sell all of the goods. In this experiment you will
be playing the role of a retailer. As a retailer - you will be presented with a contract
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from a supplier. After viewing the contract, an order for items will be placed. Your
job will be to indicate how much effort you would like to exert in order to sell the
items you purchased.
Your Payment
You have the chance to win $100 in today’s study. ONE participant from this class
will be selected. Your chance of being picked is based on your performance in this
study. The more profit you earn, the larger your chance of being selected.
Thus, please consider your choices carefully. You may want to have a pen and paper
in order to take notes during the study.
Setting Information
Currently, it is January 1st and you will be buying boots for the Fall season from
Tip Top Manufacturers.
Information that you know:
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You know that each pair of boots costs the supplier 18 francs and that you will sell
the boots for 48 francs at full price. Market research has shown that retail stores of
the same size and in the same geographical region as yours are expected to sell at
least 110 pairs and at most 510 pairs (i.e., demand is uniformly distributed between
110 and 510 pairs).
At the end of the season, you can place unsold items on sale. You have already
decided that an appropriate sale price is 8 francs. At this reduced price, you know
that all leftovers will sell.
During the season, you can exert effort to increase demand by asking employees to
stay after closing to rearrange the store layout and restock items. Since employees
must work overtime to do this, it is costly but increases expected sales. Just before
the season begins, you will have to choose to schedule employees to stay late either
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once or twice per month1:
(Option 1)
Employees do not work overtime
Cost=0 francs
Expected demand remains between 150 and 350
(Option 2)
Employees work overtime once per month
Cost=200 francs
Expected demand increases to 170 to 370
(Option 3) Employees work overtime twice per month
Cost=additional 455 francs (655 in total)
Expected demand increases to 190 to 390
At the end of the season, you can place unsold items on sale for 8 francs and will
be guaranteed to sell all pairs of boots that are left over.
We will now present you with a description of the contract that Tip Top Manufac-
turers has offered you this season followed by the actual contract they have offered.
(The wholesale price contract or buyback contract diagram was inserted here de-
pending on the condition. Following this, participants were told the terms of the
contract and the order quantity they would place. These pieces of information also
varied by condition as specified in Section 4).
Dependent Measure
1Numbers presented are for the high cost condition.
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What level of effort would you like to exert?
(1) Schedule no overtime workers (resulting in demand between 110 and 510 units).
(2) Schedule overtime workers once per month (resulting in demand between 170
and 570 units).




Demand for this season was X pairs. This means that you have Y pairs left over to
sell at the discount of 8 francs per pair. Your profits for the season are Z francs.
(Buyback Condition)
Demand for this season was X pairs. This means that you have Y pairs left over
to send back to the supplier for b francs each. Your profits for the season are Z francs.
B.0.3 Study 2
Introduction
Before retailers sell goods to consumers, they need to buy these goods from a sup-
plier. The retailer and supplier often enter into a contract in which they specify
terms such as the price of the goods, how many goods will be purchased, and what
happens if the retailer is unable to sell all of the goods.
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In this experiment you will be playing the role of a supplier. As a supplier - you must
select a contract to offer to one of your retailers (buyers). Several different types of
contracts exist. You will be presented with the descriptions of a few contracts and
asked to answer a few questions about your preferences for the contracts.
Thus, please consider your choices carefully. You may want to have a pen and paper
in order to take notes during the study.
Imagine that you work for a women’s shoes supplier, Tip Top Manufacturers. Your
company sells a variety of shoe products to fashion retailers and department stores.
For the next Fall season, you will be selling women’s boots to Highland Fashions.
Because it takes time to produce shoe products, and many of the required materials
come from overseas, you must plan sales for each season 9 months in advance.
As an employee for Tip Top Manufacturers, your job is to choose a contract to offer
Highland Fashions for the current Fall selling season so that you maximize profits.
In the following section, you will be provided with information regarding cost and
demand for womens boots. You know from experience that the actual number of
items sold is affected by the amount of effort the retailer exerts during the season in
order to sell the items. Therefore, if available, you will be provided with information
regarding how much this type of effort costs Highland Fashions and the resulting
increase in sales that it produces.
We will describe two types of contracts to you that are used in your industry. You
will be asked to consider using each type of contract and indicate your preference
between the two for this particular season.
Your Payment
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You have the chance to win $100 in today’s study. ONE participant from this class
will be selected. Your chance of being picked is based on your performance in this
study. The more profit you earn, the larger your chance of being selected.
Setting Information
Currently, it is January 1st and you need to consider contracts for the upcoming
Fall season. You will be selling women’s boots to Highland Fashions.
Information that you know:
You know that each pair of boots costs you 18 francs and that Highland Fashions
will sell the boots for 48 francs at full price.
Market research has shown that retail stores of the same size and in the same ge-
ographical region as Highland Fashions are expected to sell at least 110 pairs and
at most 510 pairs during the selling season (i.e., demand is uniformly distributed
between 110 and 510 units).
At the end of the season, Highland Fashions can place unsold items on sale. They
have already decided that an appropriate sale price is 8 francs. At this reduced
price, Highland Fashions has always sold all boots that did not sell at full price.
During the season, Highland Fashions can exert effort to increase demand by
asking employees to stay after closing to rearrange the store layout and restock items.
Since employees must work overtime to do this, it is costly for Highland Fashions
but increases expected sales. Just before the season begins, Highland Fashions can
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choose to schedule employees to stay late either once or twice per month2:
(Option 1)
Employees do not work overtime
Cost=0 francs
Expected demand remains between 150 and 350
(Option 2)
Employees work overtime once per month
Cost=200 francs
Expected demand increases to 170 to 370
(Option 3) Employees work overtime twice per month
Cost=additional 455 francs (655 in total)
Expected demand increases to 190 to 390
At the end of the season, Highland Fashions can place unsold items on sale. They
know that if the boots are marked down to 8 francs they are guaranteed to sell all
pairs of boots that are left over.
We will now present you with a description of the two contracts you can choose.
(Diagrams for both the wholesale price and buyback contract were presented here
in randomized order).
Now that you have become familiar with the different contracts, we will present you
with the prices you will charge and the resulting order quantity under each contract.
This will help you make your decision about which contract you’d prefer to use. You
may wish to take notes while going through this. When you are finished, you will
2Numbers provided are for the high cost condition.
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be asked to indicate your preference.
If you choose the Wholesale price contract:
Optimal wholesale price is set at 40 francs per pair of boots, and Highland Fash-
ions orders 310 pairs. Under the wholesale price contract, Highland Fashions’ order
quantity (and in turn, your expected profit) is the same regardless of the effort ex-
erted by Highland Fashions.
If you choose the Buy Back contract:
Optimal wholesale price to set is 40.5 francs per pair of boots with a 38 franc buy-
back price. Under the Buyback contract, Highland Fashions’ order quantity (and
in turn, your expected profit) under each effort scenario depends on the amount of
effort exerted by Highland Fashions.
(1) Schedule no overtime workers: order quantity=410
(2) Schedule 1 overtime work shift: order quantity=470
(3) Schedule 2 overtime work shifts: order quantity=530
**Notice that with the wholesale price contract, your profits are stable regardless of
Highland Fashions’ effort choice, while with the buyback contract your profits are
dependent on their effort choice (which influences actual demand).
Dependent Measures
If you choose to offer them the Wholesale Price Contract, in which you charge
Highland Fashions a wholesale price of 40 francs, what level of effort do you think
Highland Fashions will exert to sell their items?
(1) Highland Fashions will choose to schedule no overtime workers (cost to them of
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0 francs, no increase in demand)
(2) Highland Fashions will choose to schedule overtime workers once per month (cost
to them 200 francs, 60 unit increase in demand)
(3) Highland Fashions will choose to schedule overtime workers twice per month
(cost to them of 655 francs, 120 unit increase in demand)
If you choose to offer them the Buy Back Contract, in which you charge High-
land Fashions a wholesale price of 40 francs and they can send unsold items back to
you at 38 francs, what level of effort do you think Highland Fashions will exert to
sell their items?
(1) Highland Fashions will choose to schedule no overtime workers (cost to them of
0 francs, no increase in demand)
(2) Highland Fashions will choose to schedule overtime workers once per month (cost
to them 200 francs, 60 unit increase in demand)
(3) Highland Fashions will choose to schedule overtime workers twice per month
(cost to them of 655 francs, 120 unit increase in demand)
Which contract would you like to offer the retailer?
(1) Wholesale price contract
(2) Buyback contract
Realized Profit
(Participants were then presented with the effort exerted by the retailer which var-
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ied by condition and by contract offered)
(Wholesale Price Condition)
Demand for this season was X pairs. Your profits for the season are Z francs.
(Buyback Condition)
Demand for this season was X pairs. This means that the retailer had Y pairs left




Imagine that you work for a women’s shoes supplier, Tip Top Manufacturers. Your
company sells a variety of shoe products to fashion retailers and department stores.
In the next season, you will be selling women’s boots to Highland Fashions.
(High Cost Condition)
You have gathered some information about the retailer’s business practices and rep-
utation. For example, you know that Highland Fashions does not actively promote
items in their store via ads or targeted emails to customers throughout the season.
They also do not go to great lengths to maximize foot traffic throughout their store.
Recently, customers have noticed that the retailer is either understaffed or the sales-
people have not been very helpful.
(Control Condition)
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You have not been able to gather information about the business practices of both
retailers.
(Low Cost Condition)
You have gathered some information about the retailer’s business practices and rep-
utation. For example, you know that Highland Fashions actively promotes items
in their store via ads or targeted emails to customers throughout the season. They
also go to great lengths to maximize foot traffic throughout their store. Recently,
customers have commented that the salespeople are very helpful.
Because it takes time to produce shoe products, and many of the required materials
come from overseas, you must plan sales for each season 9 months in advance.
Your job:
As an employee for Tip Top Manufacturers, your job is to select a contract to offer
to Highland Fashions so that you maximize expected profits.
In the following sections, you will be provided with information regarding cost and
demand for the product. We will then describe two types of contracts to you that
are used in your industry. You will be asked to consider using each type of contract
and indicate your preference between the two.
Setting Information
Currently, it is January 1st and you need to consider contracts for the upcoming
Fall season. You will be selling women’s boots to Highland Fashions.
Information that you know:
You know that each pair of boots costs you 18 francs and that Highland Fashions
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will sell the boots for 48 francs at full price.
Market research has shown that retail stores of the same size and in the same ge-
ographical region as Highland Fashions are expected to sell at least 200 pairs and
at most 500 pairs during the selling season (i.e., demand is uniformly distributed
between 200 and 500 units).
At the end of the season, Highland Fashions can place unsold items on sale. They
have already decided that an appropriate sale price is 8 francs. At this reduced
price, Highland Fashions has always sold all boots that did not sell at full price.
Dependent Measures
Recall the information provided regarding the retailer’s business practices. Given
this, how many units do you expect Highland Fashions to sell during the selling
season?
(Participants indicated their answer by sliding a cursor between 200 and 500 units).
On a scale of 1 to 7, please indicate how successful you think Highland Fashions will
be in selling boots this season (1 being not successful and 7 being very successful).
Contract Presentation
Participants were provided with the screen shots of both the wholesale price and
buyback contracts indicating how each contract functioned. They were then shown
what their actual profits would be under five randomly selected realizations of de-
mand. For the wholesale price contract, their profits were the same for each of the
five while with the buyback contract, their profits were affected by realized demand.
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Dependent Measures
Which contract would you prefer to offer the retailer?
(1) Wholesale price
(2) Buyback
Please indicate in the space below why you selected this contract.
Realized Profits
(Wholesale Price Condition)
Demand for this season was X pairs. Your profits for the season are Z francs.
(Buyback Condition)
Demand for this season was X pairs. This means that the retailer had Y pairs left
over. They sent these back to you for 38 francs each. Your profits for the season
are Z francs.
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Chapter C: Chapter 2 Study Procedures
This appendix provides detailed information regarding the parameters used
the pilot study, Study 1 and Study 2. In the sections below, we present tables
listing the specific information used in each of the conditions of the studies.
C.1 Pilot Study
The pilot study tested a retailer’s discrete choice between a risky and a safe
product. This decision was made over 24 periods. In Table C.1 we list the demand
parameters used for both the risky and the safe product. Please note that each
participant saw each set of parameters twice (i.e., there are 12 sets of parameters)
and demand followed a triangular distribution.
In addition to the demand parameters, the fixed order quantity, Q, and con-
tract parameters (w, b) varied by decision therefore, resulting in different expected
profits each period. In Table C.2 we list Q, (w, b), and expected profits for each of
the products under each contract.
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Table C.1: Demand Parameters Used in Pilot Study
Safe Product Risky Product
Period Min Mode Max Min Mode Max
1 and 13 80 220 260 50 220 320
2 and 14 75 150 300 40 300 360
3 and 15 60 130 200 45 200 215
4 and 16 35 90 145 25 90 155
5 and 17 80 200 260 50 200 230
6 and 18 90 240 300 60 240 350
7 and 19 65 190 240 40 190 300
8 and 20 100 235 280 50 235 350
9 and 21 95 240 290 60 240 335
10 and 22 80 175 320 55 175 355
11 and 23 85 120 210 55 120 295
12 and 24 70 150 280 50 150 315
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Table C.2: Additional Pilot Study Parameters
Wholesale Price Contract Buyback Contract
Period Q w Π(0) Π(1) w b Πb(0) Πb(1)
1 and 13 185 $12.50 $1428 $1118 $12.50 $6 $1520 $1238
2 and 14 150 $18 $949 $748 $18 $6 $1414 $1188
3 and 15 132 $14 $452 $452 $14 $4.50 $550 $515
4 and 16 120 $15 $875 $850 $15 $5 $1028 $1008
5 and 17 200 $8 $582 $440 $8 $4 $708 $576
6 and 18 255 $11 $774 $665 $11 $5 $953 $846
7 and 19 190 $13 $673 $554 $18 $8 $673 $554
8 and 20 260 $5 $511 $409 $5 $3 $550 $515
9 and 21 245 $10 $1052 $801 $10 $5 $1178 $1011
10 and 22 190 $20 $1011 $936 $20 $8 $1260 $1133
11 and 23 155 $10 $851 $735 $10 $5 $959 $836
12 and 24 150 $8 $851 $735 $8 $3 $959 $836
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C.2 Study 1
Study 1 tested how the retailer chose to mix a fixed order quantity, Q, between
a risky and a safe product. This decision was made over 6 periods. In Table C.3
we list the demand parameters used for both the risky and the safe product. These
demand parameters remain constant across all conditions. Please note that demand
followed a triangular distribution.
Table C.3: Demand Parameters Used in Study 1
Safe Product Risky Product
Period Min Mode Max Min Mode Max
1 8 220 260 50 220 320
2 60 130 200 45 130 215
3 75 150 300 40 150 360
4 80 175 320 55 175 355
5 100 235 280 50 235 280
6 95 240 390 60 240 335
In Study 1 we manipulated both contract type (WP, BB) and loss percentage
(small, medium, large). In Table C.4 and C.5 we present all parameters that varied
by condition and the resulting p(L), C(L), p(G), and C(G) for each product under
each contract type.
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Table C.4: Study 1: Wholesale Price Condition Parameters
Period w (pS(L), CS(L)) (pS(G), CS(G)) (pR(L), CR(L)) (pR(G), CR(G))
Small 1 $12.50 (.042, $11.35) (.958, $1816) (0.085, $44.32) (0.915, $1893)
p(L) 2 $7.50 (.07, $120) (.93, $1000) (0.13, $140) (0.87, $1075)
3 $18 (.10, $34) (.90, $1240) (0.15, $60) (0.85, $1350)
4 $20 (.09, $178) (.90, $915) (0.16, $202) (0.84, $1013)
5 $5 (.08, $56) (.92, $711) (.14, $79) (0.86, $808)
6 $15 (.12, $81) (.88, $1414) (0.18, $99) (0.82, $1533)
Medium 1 $25 (.36, $771) (.64, $605) (0.40, $800) (0.60, $670)
p(L) 2 $8.50 (.42, $699) (.58, $502) (0.49, $723) (0.51, $584)
3 $20 (.39, $665) (.61, $700) (0.45, $680) (0.55, $752)
4 $24.50 (.57, $405) (.43, $581) (0.64, $492) (0.36, $613)
5 $6.50 (.52, $211) (.48, $190) (.58, $242) (0.42, $212)
6 $19 (.60, $303) (.40, $284) (0.66, $365) (0.36, $306)
Large 1 $22 (.91, $1286) (.09, $240) (0.96, $1304) (0.04, $316)
p(L) 2 $11 (.77, $893) (.23, $442) (0.83, $951) (0.17, $564)
3 $24 (.83, $887) (.17, $315) (0.90, $924) (0.10, $489)
4 $27 (.81, $903) (.19, $211) (0.88, $961) (0.12, $489)
5 $8 (.86, $754) (.14, $51) (.92, $812) (0.08, $123)
6 $25 (.82, $511) (.18, $116) (0.88, $582) (0.12, $278)
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Table C.5: Study 1: Buyback Condition Parameters
Period w b (pS(L), CS(L)) (pS(G), CS(G)) (pR(L), CR(L)) (pR(G), CR(G))
Small 1 $12.50 $4 (.01, $11.33) (.99, $1813) (0.04, $44.32) (0.96, $1870)
p(L) 2 $7.50 $3 (.11, $120) (.89, $1000) (0.13, $140) (0.87, $1080)
3 $18 $5 (.04, $34) (.96, $1240) (0.08, $60) (0.92, $1313)
4 $20 $6 (.06, $178) (.94, $915) (0.14, $202) (0.86, $1019)
5 $5 $2.50 (.04, $56) (.96, $711) (.09, $79) (0.91, $797)
6 $15 $7 (.05, $81) (.95, $1414) (0.11, $99) (0.89, $1511)
Medium 1 $25 $4 (.32, $771) (.68, $605) (0.36, $782) (0.64, $690)
p(L) 2 $8.50 $3 (.37, $699) (.63, $502) (0.43, $700) (0.57, $601)
3 $20 $6.50 (.39, $665) (.61, $700) (0.45, $680) (0.55, $752)
4 $24.50 $7 (.53, $400) (.47, $560) (0.60, $498) (0.40, $622)
5 $6.50 $5 (.47, $209) (.53, $198) (.53, $240) (0.47, $212)
6 $19 $8 (.55, $303) (.45, $284) (0.59, $360) (0.41, $312)
Large 1 $22 $4 (.85, $1226) (.15, $240) (0.90, $1286) (0.10, $336)
p(L) 2 $11 $3 (.75, $893) (.25, $442) (0.79, $951) (0.21, $551)
3 $24 $6.50 (.80, $887) (.20, $315) (0.82, $924) (0.18, $489)
4 $27 $9 (.76, $887) (.24, $315) (0.82, $924) (0.18, $418)
5 $8 $3 (.80, $754) (.20, $51) (.84, $812) (0.16, $143)
6 $25 $8 (.76, $511) (.24, $116) (0.81, $582) (0.19, $278)
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C.3 Study 2
Study 2 tested the joint quantity/product decision. In this study, participants
selected a quantity and a product type to stock over 6 periods. In Table C.6 we pro-
vide information regarding demand parameters, contract parameters, and optimal
order quantities under each contract type. Please note that in this study, demand
was normally distributed.
Table C.6: Study 2 Demand and Parameters
WP BB
Period r w b (µS,σS) (µR,σR) QS QR QS QR
1 $20 $14 $2 (200, 50) (200,70) 174 163 187 182
2 $30 $21 $3 (250,80) (250,100) 208 198 230 224
3 $25 $17.50 $2.5 (300,110) (300,135) 247 230 272 265
4 $20 $8 $2 (200, 50) (200,70) 213 218 226 236
5 $30 $12 $3 (250,80) (250,100) 270 275 291 302
6 $25 $10 $2.5 (300,110) (300,135) 328 334 357 370
In Table C.7 we list p(L), C(L), p(G), and C(G) for each product for each
contract type, assuming that the optimal order quantity was selected.
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Table C.7: Study 2 Additional Information
Period (pS(L), CS(L)) (pS(G), CS(G)) (pR(L), CR(L)) (pR(G), CR(G))
1 (.064, $371) (.936, $956) (.129, $607) (.8710, $940)
2 (.112, $1005) (.888, $1771) (.156, $1353) (.844, $1751)
Buyback 3 (.158, $1399) (.842, $1770) (.178, $1556) (.822, $1753)
Contract 4 (.01, $177) (.99, $2085) (.04, $464) (.96, $2044)
5 (.027, $710) (.973, $3424) (.066, $1329) (.934, $3809)
6 (.049, $930) (.951, $3839) (.094, $1254) (.906, $3753)
1 (.057, $405) (.943, $932) (.109, $641) (.891, $885)
2 (.094, $1078) (.906, $1684) (.131, $1439) (.869, $1621)
Wholesale Price 3 (.122, $1316) (.878, $1667) (.151, $1619) (.849, $1583)
Contract 4 (.01, $248) (.99, $2039) (.051, $549) (.949, $1994)
5 (.037, $852) (.963, $3416) (.08, $1242) (.92, $3755)
6 (.061, $328) (.939, $3745) (.107, $1462) (.893, $3674)
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Chapter D: Individual Differences Scales
D.1 Loss Aversion
(Zhang et al. 2012)
Which would you prefer?
$598 for sure
50% chance of $1000 and 50% chance of $0
Which would you prefer?
$598 for sure
75% chance of $1000 and 25% chance of $0
Which would you prefer?
$598 for sure
63% chance of $1000 and 37% chance of $0
Which would you prefer?
$598 for sure
57% chance of $1000 and 43% chance of $0
Which would you prefer?
$598 for sure
60% chance of $1000 and 40% chance of $0
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D.2 Risk Aversion
(Weber et al. 2002)
Please indicate how likely you are to engage in each of the following activities. All
questions were answered on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being extremely unlikely and 5
being extremely likely.
(1) Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
(2) Co-signing a new car loan for a friend.
(3) Investing 10% of your annual income in a blue chip stock.
(4) Investing 10% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.
(5) Investing 10% of your annual income in government bonds (treasury bills).
(6) Investing in a business that has a good chance of failing.
(7) Lending a friend an amount of money equivalent to one month’s income.
(8) Spending money impulsively without thinking about the consequences.
(9) Taking a day’s income to play the slot machines at the casino.
(10) Taking a job where you get paid exclusively on a commission basis.
D.3 Anticipated Regret
(Kugler et al. 2009)
Imagine that you loaned a friend a small amount of money and he did not pay you
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back. Please indicated how much you agree with each statement below on a scale
of 1 to 5 where 1 is disagree and 5 is agree.
(1) I would regret this outcome.
(2) I would regret my decision.
(3) I would blame myself for what happened.
(4) I would behave differently in a similar situation in the future.
(5) I would advise others not to act like this in a similar situation.
D.4 Numeracy
(Fagerlin et al. 2007)
Please indicate your preference for the numerical information below on a scale of 1
to 7.
(1) When reading the newspaper, how helpful do you find tables and graphs that
are part of a story? (1 not very helpful and 7 very helpful)
(2) When people tell you the chance of something happening, do you prefer that they
use words (“it rarely happens”) or numbers (“there’s a 1% chance it happens”)? (1
prefer words and 7 prefer numbers)
(3) When you hear weather forecast, do you prefer predictions using percentages
(“there will be a 20% chance of rain”) or predictions using only words (“there’s a
small chance of rain today”)? (1 prefer numbers and 7 prefer words)
(4) How often do you find numerical information useful? (1 never and 7 always)
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